U.S. Supreme Court

STATE OF KAN. v. STATE OF COLO., 206 U.S. 46 (1907)

206 U.S. 46

STATE OF KANSAS, Complainant,v.

STATE OF COLORADO et al., Defendants, The United States of America, Intervener.

No. 3, Original.

Argued December 17, 18, 19, 20, 1906.

Decided May 13, 1907.

'The gravamen of the bill is that the state of Colorado, acting directly herself as well as through private persons thereto licensed, is depriving and threatening to deprive the state of Kansas and its inhabitants of all the water heretofore accustomed to flow in the Arkansas river through its channel on the surface, and through a subterranean course across the state of Kansas; that this is threatened not only by the impounding and the use of the water at the river's source, but as it flows On May 20, 1901, pursuant to a resolution passed by the legislature of Kansas (Kan. Laws 1901, chap. 425), and upon leave obtained, the state of Kansas filed its bill in equity in this court against the state of Colorado. To this bill the defendant demurred. After argument on the demurrer this court held that the case ought not to be disposed of on the mere averments of the bill, and, therefore, overruled the demurrer without prejudice to any question defendant might present. Leave was also given to answer.  185 U.S. 125 , 46 L. ed. 838, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552. In delivering the opinion of the court the Chief justice disclosed in the following words the general character of the controversy, and the conclusions arrived at (p. 145, L. ed. p. 846, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 559):

'The state of Kansas appeals to the rule of the common law that owners of lands on the banks of a river are entitled to the continual flow of the stream; and while she concedes that this rule has been modified in the Western states so that flowing water may be appropriated to mining purposes and for the reclamation of arid lands, and the doctrine of prior appropriation obtains, yet she says that that modification has not gone so far as to justify the destruction of the rights of other states and their inhabitants altogether; and that the acts of Congress of 1866 and subsequently, while recognizing the prior appropriation of water as in contravention of the common-law rule as to a continuous flow, have not attempted to recognize it as rightful to that extent. In other words, Kansas contends that Colorado cannot absolutely destroy her rights, and seeks some mode of accommodation as between them, while she further insists that she occupies, for reasons given, the position of a prior appropriator herself, if put to that contention as between her and Colorado.

'Sitting, as it were, as an international as well as a domestic tribunal, we apply Federal law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the particular case may demand, and we are unwilling, in this case, to proceed on the mere technical admissions made by the demurrer. Nor do we regard it as necessary, whatever imperfections a close analysis of the pend- after reaching the river. Injury, it is averred, is being, and would be, thereby inflicted on the state of Kansas as an individual owner, and on all the inhabitants of the state, and especially on the inhabitants of that part of the state lying in the Arkansas valley. The injury is asserted to be threatened, and as being wrought, in respect of lands located on the banks of the river; lands lying on the line of a subterranean flow; and lands lying some distance from the river, either above or below ground, but dependent on the river for a supply of water. And it is insisted that Colorado, in doing this, is violating the fundamental principle that one must use his own so as not to destroy the legal rights of another.

ing bill may disclose, to compel its amendment at this stage of the litigation. We think proof should be made as to whether Colorado is herself actually threatening to wholly exhaust the flow of the Arkansas river in Kansas; whether what is described in the bill as the 'underflow' is a subterranean stream flowing in a known and defined channel, and not merely water percolating through the strata below; whether certain persons, firms, and corporations in Colorado must be made parties hereto; what lands in Kansas are actually situated on the banks of the river, and what, either in Colorado or Kansas, are absolutely dependent on water therefrom; the extent of the watershed or the drainage area of the Arkansas river; the possibilities of the maintenance of a sustained flow through the control of flood waters,-in short, the circumstances, a variation in which might induce the court to either grant, modify, or deny the relief sought or any part thereof.'

On August 17, 1903, Kansas filed an amended bill, naming as defendants Colorado and quite a number of corporations, who were charged to be engaged in depleting the flow of water in the Arkansas river. Colorado and several of the corporations answered. For reasons which will be apparent from the opinion the defenses of these corporations will not be considered apart from those of Colorado. On March 21, 1904, the United States, upon leave, filed its petition of intervention. The issue between these several parties having been perfected by replications, a commissioner was appointed to take evidence, and, after that had been taken and abstracts prepared, counsel for the respective parties were heard in argument, and upon the pleadings and testimony the case was submitted.

In order that the issue between the three principal parties, Kansas, Colorado, and the United States, may be fully disclosed,-although by so doing we prolong considerably this opinion,-we quote abstracts of the pleadings and statements thereof made by the respective counsel. Counsel for Kansas say:

'The bill of complaint alleges that the state of Kansas was admitted into the Union on January 29, 1861, that the state of Colorado was admitted on August 1, 1876, and that the other defendants are corporations organized, chartered, and doing business in the state of Colorado; that the Arkansas river rises in the Rocky mountains, in the state of Colorado, and, flowing in a southeasterly direction for a distance of about 280 miles, crosses the boundary into the state of Kansas; that the river then flows in an easterly and southeasterly direction through the state of Kansas for a distance of about 300 miles, then through Oklahoma, Indian territory, and Arkansas, on its way to the sea. Through the state of Kansas the Arkansas valley is a level plain but a few feet above the normal level of the river, and is from 2 to 25 miles in width. Back to the foothills on either side there are bottom lands which are saturated and subirrigated by the underflow from the river, and are fertile and productive almost beyond comparison. The Arkansas river is a meandered stream through the state of Kansas, and under the laws and departmental rules and regulations of the United States it is a navigable river through the state of Kansas, and was, in fact, navigable and navigated from the city of Wichita south to its mouth; and that the complainant is the owner of the bed of the stream between the meandered lines in trust for the people of the state; that the complainant is the owner of two tracts of land bordering upon the river, one at Hutchinson and one at Dodge City, upon which state institutions are maintained,-one as a reform school and the other as a soldiers' home. That when the state of Kansas was admitted into the Union it became the owner, for school purposes, of sections 16 and 36 of each congressional township, of which the complainant still owns many thousand acres, much of which borders on the Arkansas river. That by act of Congress of March 3, 1863 [12 Stat. at L. 772, chap. 98], the complainant became the owner of each odd-numbered section of land in the Arkansas valley and has since conveyed the whole of this land for the purposes specified. That by the year 1868

'That after the lands in the Arkansas valley had been settled and raised to a high state of cultivation, all the bottom lands in the valley being riparian lands and directly affected by the presence and flow of the river, and after parts of the flow of the river had been used for manufacturing and milling purposes, and after the riparian lands had been largely and extensively irrigated in the valley of the river in the western portion of the land in the Arkansas valley began to be taken by actual settlers, and by the year 1875 practically all the bottom lands in the east or lower half of the valley were entered and settled, and title obtained from the United States or the state of Kansas; and by the year 1882 the west or upper half of the valley was so entered and settled and like titles obtained. By the year 1873 a railroad was built through the entire length of the valley, and immediately after their settlement these bottom lands were extensively cultivated, large crops of agricultural products were raised, towns and cities sprang up, population rapidly increased, and by the year 1883 practically all the bottom lands of the Arkansas valley were in a state of successful and prosperous cultivation; that the waters of the Arkansas river furnished the foundation for this prosperity. These waters furnished a wholesome and ample supply for domestic purposes, for the watering of stock, for power for operating mills and factories, for saturating and subirrigating the bottom lands back to the uplands on either side of the river, so that crops thereon were not only bounteous but practically certain, and in the western portion of the valley these waters were appropriated and used for surface irrigation, to supplant the scanty rainfall in that region. That by reason of these uses of the waters of the Arkansas river, and the almost unvarying water level beneath these bottom lands being near the surface, the lands in the Arkansas valley in the state of Kansas were of great and permanent value to the owners and settlers thereon, and those upon the tax rolls of the state of Kansas yielded a large and increasing revenue to the complainant for state purposes.

Kansas, and after portions of the land so belonging to the complainant had been sold and conveyed, the state of Colorado and other defendants began systematically appropriating and diverting the waters of the Arkansas river, in the state of Colorado, between Ca non City and the Kansas state line, for the purpose of irrigating dry, barren, arid, nonriparian, and nonsaturated lands lying on either side of the river, and often many miles therefrom and by the year 1891 all the natural and cormal waters and a large portion of the flood waters of the Arkansas river were so appropriated and diverted and actually applied to these dry, barren, arid, nonriparian, and nonsaturated lands in the state of Colorado, said diversions increasing from year to year, as their means of diversion became more complete and perfect, so the average flow of the river was greatly and permanently diminished and the normal flow of the river, exclusive of floods, was wholly and permanently destroyed, the navigability of the river where navigable before has been ruined, the power for manufacturing purposes greatly diminished, the surfact of the underflow beneath the bottom lands has been lowered about 5 feet, and the water for the irrigation ditches in the western part of Kansas has been entirely cut off. The loss sustained by the complainant and its citizens has been great and incalculable. The benefits of river navigation are gone; the cheap water power has been replaced by the costly steam power; the productiveness and value of the bottom lands have been greatly diminished; the irrigation ditches are left dry and the lands uncultivated; and the revenues of the state of Kansas and its municipalities have been materially decreased. Against this loss and injury the complainant prays the assistance of this court.'

'The contention of the defendant, state of Colorado, as to the facts, may be concisely stated as follows: The Arkansas river, popularly so called, is substantially two rivers,-one a perennial stream rising in the mountains of Colorado and flowing down to the plains, and this Colorado Arkansas, when the In the brief of counsel for Colorado it is said:

'Now, the irrigators of Colorado have confined their actions to the Colorado Arkansas above described. They have taken the waters of the perennial stream before it reaches this sieve, through which it wasted; they have lifted that stream out of river was permitted to run as it was accustomed to run, prior to the period of irrigation, poured into the sands of western Kansas, and at times of low water the river as a stream entirely disappeared. Its waters were to some extent evaporated, and, as to the residue, were absorbed and swallowed up in the sands. So that from the vicinity of the state line between Kansas and Colorado on eastwardly, as far, at least, as Great Bend, if not farther, at such times of low water there was no flowing Arkansas river. Farther east, however, a new river arose, even at such times of low water, and partly from springs, partly from the drainage of the water table of the country supplied by rainfall, and partly from the surface drainage of an extensive territory, this river gradually again became a perennial stream, so that south of Wichita, and from there on to the mouth of the river the Kansas Arkansas, as a new and separate stream, had a constant flow. Such, as the river was accustomed to flow, was the Arkansas of the period prior to irrigation. It was a 'broken river.' It is true that at all times in early years, and now, the Arkansas river at times of flood, or of what might be called high water, has a continuous flow from its source to its mouth; but a flow, even in times of flood or high water, which diminishes through the sandy waste east of the Colorado state line above described, so that oftentimes even a flood in Colorado would be completely lost before it had passed over this arid stretch of sandy channel, and high water would always be diminished in flow through the same stretch of country. This river is as if it were a current of water passing over a sieve; if the current be slow and the volume not excessive all of it sinks through the sieve and none passes on beyond; when the current is rapid and the volume is large, still a large amount sinks in the sieve, and the residue passes on beyond.

the sandy channel in which it had flowed, and applied it to beneficial uses upon the land; carried the body of it along at a higher level than where it was accustomed to run, and they finally restore it, practically undiminished in volume, so far as regards practical use, at points in the ancient channel farther east than the river at low water was accustomed to flow before the period of irrigation. The effect of the diversion of this water in Colorado, the carrying of it forward on a higher level, the return of waters, partly through seepage and partly through direct delivery at waste gates, and the effect of this process in extending eastward the perennial flow, will be fully discussed in the course of the argument to follow. It is sufficient in this preliminary statement to say that it is admitted by the complainant that in the course of a twelvemonth there is a vast amount of high and flood waters of the Arkansas that are never captured by man, that are of no use, but are rather of injury to Kansas riparian proprietors, and, so far as any beneficial use is concerned, are absolutely wasted and lost. Kansas does not claim that she has not abundance of water in times of flood or in times of high water; her complaint is based upon the alleged fact that she does not have what she was accustomed to have in periods of low water, whereas, in fact, as contended by the state of Colorado, the diversion of water in Colorado into ditches and reservoirs, continuing, as it does, throughout the year, in times of flood and in times of high water, has the effect, through seepage and return waters, to give perennial vitality to portions of this stream during what would otherwise be periods of depression or suspension of flow.'

'The first paragraph of the said petition describes the Arkansas river from its source to its mouth, and alleges that it is not navigable in the states of Colorado and Kansas nor the territory of Oklahoma, but is navigable in the state of Arkansas and the Indian territory.

'In the second paragraph it is alleged that the lands located The substance of the petition in intervention is thus stated by counsel for the government:

'The third paragraph alleges that within said watershed there are 1, 000,000 acres of public lands that are uninhabitable and unsalable.

'The fourth paragraph alleges that said lands can only be made habitable, productive, and salable by impounding and storing flood and other waters in said watershed to the end that the said waters may be used to reclaim said land.

'The fifth paragraph alleges that there is not sufficient moisture from rainfall to render the soil capable of producing crops in paying quantities in the watershed so described, and that they can only be made to produce crops by irrigation; that the common-law doctrine of riparian rights is not applicable to conditions in the arid region and has been abolished by statute and by usage and custom; that there has been established in its stead in said region a doctrine to the effect that the waters of natural streams and the flood and other waters may be impounded, appropriated, diverted, and used for the purpose of reclaiming and irrigating the arid land, therein, and that the prior appropriation of such waters for such purpose gives a prior and superior right to the water of the stream.

'The sixth paragraph alleges that legislation of Congress, decisions of courts, and acts of the executive department have sanctioned and approved the use of water for irrigation purposes in the arid region, and that he who is prior in time is prior in right, and that it is recognized that the common-law doctrine of riparian rights is not applicable to the public land owned by the United States in the arid region.

'The seventh paragraph alleges that, in accordance with and in reliance upon the doctrine of the use of water for irrigation purposes, the inhabitants of the arid portion of the United States have appropriated and used the waters of streams therein to reclaim and make productive and profitable about 10,000,000 acres of land, which now support a population of many millions, and that the inhabitants of Colorado and Kansas within the watershed of the river west of the 99th degree of longitude are arid lands.

'The eighth paragraph alleges that the common-law doctrine of riparian rights is not applicable to riparian lands within the arid region, and that only by the use of waters of natural streams and flood waters for irrigation and other beneficial purposes can the lands in the arid region be made productive, and only by such use can additional areas be reclaimed and rendered productive and salable.

'The ninth paragraph recites the passage of the so-called reclamation act of June 17, 1902. [32 Stat. at L. 388, chap. 1093, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1905, p. 349.]

'The tenth paragraph alleges that about 60,000,000 acres of land belonging to the United States within the arid region can be reclaimed under the provisions of the socalled reclamation act.

'The eleventh paragraph alleges that the amount of land that can be so reclaimed will support a population of many millions.

'The twelfth paragraph alleges that, under the operation of the said reclamation act, 100,000 acres of public land can be reclaimed within the watershed of the Arkansas river west of the 99th degree west.

'The thirteenth paragraph alleges that the lands, when so reclaimed, will support a population of not less that 50,000.

'The fourteenth paragraph alleges that, under the operation of the so- called reclamation act, about $1,000,000 has been expended in exploring, procuring, and setting apart sites upon which reservoirs and dams contemplated by the act can be constructed and maintained; that contracts have been let for the construction of reservoirs which, when completed, will cost over two millions and will have a stronge capacity to reclaim 500,000 acres of arid land, which land when reclaimed will sustain a population of not less than 250,000; that plans are contemplated for the expenditure of $20,000,000 under within the watershed of the Arkansas river have, by irrigation from said river, made productive and profitable about 200,000 acres of land, which provide homes for and support a population of many thousands.

'The fifteenth paragraph recites that there are $16,000,000 available under the so-called reclamation act.

'The sixteenth paragraph sets forth the contention of Kansas as seen in its amended bill of complaint, viz., that it is entitled to have the waters of the Arkansas river, which rises in Colorado, flow uninterrupted and unimpeded into Kansas.

'The seventeenth paragraph sets forth the contention of Colorado in respect to its claim of ownership, viz., that under the provisions of its Constitution it is the owner of all waters within that state.

'The eighteenth paragraph is as follows:

"That neither the contention of the state of Colorado nor the contention of the state of Kansas is correct; nor does either contention accord with the doctrine prevailing in the arid region in respect to the waters of natural streams and of flood and other waters. That either contention, if sustained, would defeat the object, intent, and purpose of the reclamation act, prevent the settlement and sale of the arid lands belonging to the United States, and especially those within the watershed of the Arkansas river west of the 99th degree west longitude, and would otherwise work great damage to the interests of the United States." said act, to irrigate about 1,000,000 acres of arid public lands.

Messrs. S. S. Ashbaugh, N. H. Loomis, C. C. Coleman, and F. Dumont Smith for complainant.

Messrs. Clyde C. Dawson, Platt Rogers, N. C. Miller, Joel F. Vaile, Charles D. Hayt, C. W. Waterman, F. E. Gregg, W. R. Ramsey, and I. B. Melville for defendant the state of Colorado.

Messrs. David C. Beaman, Cass E. Herrington, and Fred Herrington for defendant the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company.

Messrs. Platt Rogers, John F. Shafroth, and Frank E. Gregg for defendant the Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet & Irrigated Land Company.

Mr. C. C. Goodale for defendant the Graham Ditch Company.

Mr. C. E. Gast for defendant the Fort Lyon Canal Company.

Mr. F. A. Sabin for defendants the Rocky Ford Canal, Reservoir, Land, Loan, & Trust Company, the Catlin Consolidated Canal Company, the Oxford Farmers Ditch Company, and the Lake Canal Company.

Solicitor General Hoyt, Assistant Attorney General Campbell, and Mr. A. C. Campbell for intervener, the United States.

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

While we said in overruling the demurrer that 'this court, speaking broadly, has jurisdiction,' we contemplated further consideration of both the fact and the extent of our jurisdiction, to be fully determined after the facts were presented. We therefore commence with this inquiry. And first, of our jurisdiction of the controversy between Kansas and Colorado.

This suit involves no question of boundary or of the limits of territorial jurisdiction. Other and incorporeal rights are claimed by the respective litigants. Controversies between the states are becoming frequent, and, in the rapidly changing conditions of life and business, are likely to become still more so. Involving, as they do, the rights of political communities which in many respects are sovereign and independent, they present not infrequently questions of far-reaching import and of exceeding difficulty.

It is well, therefore, to consider the foundations of our jurisdiction over controversies between states. It is no longer open to question that by the Constitution a nation was brought into being, and that that instrument was not merely operative to establish a closer union or league of states. Whatever powers of government were granted to the nation or reserved to the states (and for the description and limitation of those powers we must always accept the Constitution as alone and absolutely controlling), there was created a nation, to be known as the United States of America, and as such then assumed its place among the nations of the world.

The first resolution passed by the convention that framed the Constitution, sitting as a committee of the whole, was 'Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee that a national government ought to be established, consisting of a

supreme legislative, judiciary, and executive.' 1 Elliot, Debates, p. 151.

'The government of the Union, then (whatever may be the influence of this fact on the case), is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.' In M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405, 4 L. ed. 579, 601, Chief Justice Marshall said:

See also Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat, 304, 324, 4 L. ed. 97, 102, opinion by Mr. Justice Story.

'The new government was not a mere change in a dynasty, or in a form of government, leaving the nation or sovereignty the same, and clothed with all the rights, and bound by all the obligations, of the preceding one. But, when the present United States came into existence under the new government, it was a new political body, a new nation, then for the first time taking its place in the family of nations.' In Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 441, 15 L. ed. 691, 715, Chief Justice Taney observed:

And in Miller on the Constitution of the United States, p. 83, referring to the adoption of the Constitution, that learned jurist said: 'It was then that a nation was born.'

In the Constitution are provisions in separate articles for the three great departments of government,-legislative, executive, and judicial. But there is this significant difference in the grants of powers to these departments: The first article, treating of legislative powers, does not make a general grant of legislative power. It reads: 'Article 1, 1. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress,' etc.; and then, in article 8, mentions and defines the legislative powers that are granted. By reason of the fact that there is no general grant of legislative power it has become an accepted constitutional rule that this is a government of enumerated powers.

'This government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. The principal that it can exercise only the powers granted to it would seem too apparent to have required to be enforced by all those arguments which its enlightened friends, while it was depending before the people, found it necessary to urge. That principle is now universally admitted.' In M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 405, 4 L. ed. 601, Chief Justice Marshall said:

'This question, important in itself, will depend on others more important still; and may, perhaps, be ultimately resolved into one no less redical than this,-Do the people of the United States form a nation?' On the other hand, in article 3, which treats of the judicial department,-and this is important for our present consideration,-we find that 1 reads that 'the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.' By this is granted the entire judicial power of the nation. Section 2, which provides that 'the judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States,' etc., is not a limitation nor an enumeration. It is a definite declaration,-a provision that the judicial power shall extend to-that is, shall include-the several matters particularly mentioned, leaving unrestricted the general grant of the entire judicial power. There may be, of course, limitations on that grant of power, but, if there are any, they must be expressed; for otherwise the general grant would vest in the courts all the judicial power which the new nation was capable of exercising. Construing this article in the early case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L. ed. 440, the court held that the judicial power of the Supreme Court extended to a suit brought against a state by a citizen of another state. In announcing his opinion in the case, Mr. Justice Wilson said (p. 453, L. ed. p. 454):

In reference to this question attention may, however, properly be called to Hans v. Louisiana,  134 U.S. 1 , 33 L. ed. 842, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 504.

The decision in Chisholm v. Georgia led to the adoption of the 11th Amendment to the Constitution, withdrawing from the judicial power of the United States every suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state or citizens or subjects of a foreign state. This amendment refers only to suits and actions by individuals, leaving undisturbed the jurisdiction over suits or actions by one state against another. As said by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 407, 5 L. ed. 257, 291: 'The Amendment, therefore, extended to suits commenced or prosecuted by individuals, but not to those brought by states.' See also South Dakota v. North Carolina,  192 U.S. 286 , 48 L. ed. 448, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269.

Speaking generally, it may be observed that the judicial power of a nation extends to all controversies justiciable in their nature, and the parties to which or the property involved in which may be reached by judicial process, and, when the judicial power of the United States was vested in the Supreme and other courts, all the judicial power which the nation was capable of exercising was vested in those tribunals; and unless there be some limitations expressed in the Constitution it must be held to embrace all controversies of a justiciable nature arising within the territorial limits of the nation, no matter who may be the parties thereto. This general truth is not inconsistent with the decisions that no suit or action can be maintained against the nation in any of its courts without its consent, for they only recognize the obvious truth that a nation is not, without its consent, subject to the controlling action of any of its instrumentalities or agencies. The creature cannot rule the creator. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank,  205 U.S. 349 , 51 L. ed. 834, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526. Nor is it inconsistent with the ruling in Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co.  127 U.S. 265 , 32 L. ed. 239, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370, that an original action cannot be maintained in this court by one state to enforce its penal laws against a citizen of another state. That was no denial of the jurisdiction of the court, but a decision upon the merits of the claim of the state.

These considerations lead to the propositions that when a

legislative power is claimed for the national government the question is whether that power is one of those granted by the Constitution, either in terms or by necessary implication; whereas, in respect to judicial functions, the question is whether there by any limitations expressed in the Constitution on the general grant of national power.

We may also notice a matter in respect thereto referred to at length in Missouri v. Illinois,  180 U.S. 208, 220 , 45 S. L. ed. 497, 504, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 331, 336. The 9th article of the Articles of Confederation provided that 'the United States in Congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or more states concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever.' In the early drafts of the Constitution provision was made giving to the Supreme Court 'jurisdiction of controversies between two or more states, except such as shall regard territory or jurisdiction,' and also that the Senate should have exclusive power to regulate the manner of deciding the disputes and controversies between the states respecting jurisdiction or territory. As finally adopted, the Constitution omits all provisions for the Senate taking cognizance of disputes between the states, and leaves out the exception referred to in the jurisdiction granted to the Supreme Court. That carries with it a very direct recognition of the fact that to the Supreme Court is granted jurisdiction of all controversies between the states which are justiciable in their nature. 'All the states have transferred the decision of their controversies to this court; each had a right to demand of it the exercise of the power which they had made judicial by the Confederation of 1781 and 1788; that we should do that which neither states nor Congress could do,-settle the controversies between them.' Rhode Islands v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 743, 9 L. ed. 1233, 1268

Under the same general grant of judicial power jurisdiction over suits brought by the United States has been sustained. United States v. Texas,  143 U.S. 621 , 36 L. ed. 285, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488,  162 U.S. 1 , 40 L. ed. 867, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 725; United States v. Michigan,  190 U.S. 379 , 47 L. ed. 1103, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 742.

The exemption of the United States to suit in one of its own courts without its consent has been repeatedly recognized. Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 231, 341, 51 S. L. ed. --, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 388, and cases cited.

Turning now to the controversy as here presented, it is whether Kansas has a right to the continuous flow of the waters of the Arkansas river, as that flow existed before any human interference therewith, or Colorado the right to appropriate the waters of that stream so as to prevent that continuous flow, or that the amount of the flow is subject to the superior authority and supervisory control of the United States. While several of the defendant corporations have answered, it is unnecessary to specially consider their defenses, for, if the case against Colorado fails, it fails also as against them. Colorado denies that it is in any substantial manner diminishing the flow of the Arkansas river into Kansas. If that be true, then it is in no way infringing upon the rights of Kansas. If it is diminishing that flow, has it an absolute right to determine for itself the extent to which it will diminish it, even to the entire appropriation of the water? And if it has not that absolute right, is the amount of appropriation that it is now making such an infringment upon the rights of Kansas as to call for judicial interference? Is the question one solely between the states, or is the matter subject to national legislative regulation? and, if the latter, to what extent has that regulation been carried? Clearly this controversy is one of a justiciable nature. The right to the flow of a stream was one recognized at common law, for a trespass upon which a cause of action existed.

The primary question is, of course, of national control. For, if the nation has the right to regulate the flow of the waters, we must inquire what it has done in the way of regulation. If it has done nothing the further question will then arise, What are the respective rights of the two states, in the absence of national regulation? Congress has, by virtue of the grant to it of power to regulate commerce 'among the several states,' extensive control over the highways, natural or artificial, upon which such commerce may be carried. It may prevent or remove

'Although this power of changing the common-law rule as to streams within its dominion undoubtedly belongs to each state, yet two limitations must be recognized: First, that in the absence of specific authority from Congress a state cannot, by its legislation, destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so far, at least, as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property. Second, that it is limited by the superior power of the general government to secure the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams within the limits of the United States. In other words, the jurisdiction of the general government over interstate commerce and its natural highways vests in that government the right to take all needed measures to preserve the navigability of the navigable water courses of the country, even against any state action.' obstructions in the natural water ways and preserve the navigability of those ways. In United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co.  174 U.S. 690 , 43 L. ed. 1136, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770, in which was considered the validity of the appropriation of the water of a stream by virtue of local legislation, so far as such appropriation affected the navigability of the stream, we said (p. 703, L. ed. p. 1141, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 775):

It follows from this that if, in the present case, the national government was asserting, as against either Kansas or Colorado, that the appropriation for the purposes of irrigation of the waters of the Arkansas was affecting the navigability of the stream, it would become our duty to determine the truth of the charge. But the government makes no such contention. On the contrary, it distinctly asserts that the Arkansas river is not now and never was practically navigable beyond Fort Gibson in the Indian territory, and nowhere claims that any appropriation propriation of the waters by Kansas or Colorado affects its navigability.

It rests its petition of intervention upon its alleged duty of legislating for the reclamation of arid lands; alleges that in or near the Arkansas river, as it runs through Kansas and Colo-

rado, are large tracts of those lands; that the national government is itself the owner of many thousands of acres; that it has the right to make such legislative provision as, in its judgment, is needful for the reclamation of all these arid lands, and, for that purpose, to appropriate the accessible waters.

'That the doctrine of riparian rights is inapplicable to conditions prevailing in the arid region; that such doctrine, if applicable in said region, would prevent the sale, reclamation, and cultivation of the public arid lands, and defeat the policy of the government in respect thereto; that the doctrine which is applicable to conditions in said arid region, and which prevails therein, is that the waters of natural streams may be used to irrigate and cultivate arid lands, whether riparian or nonriparian, and that the priority of appropriation of such waters and the application of the same for beneficial purposes establishes a prior and superior right.' In support of the main proposition it is stated in the brief of its counsel:

In other words, the determination of the rights of the two states inter sese in regard to the flow of waters in the Arkansas river is subordinate to a superior right on the part of the national government to control the whole system of the reclamation of arid lands. That involves the question whether the reclamation of arid lands is one of the powers granted to the general government. As heretofore stated, the constant declaration of this court from the beginning is that this government is one of enumerated powers. 'The government, then, of the United States, can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution, and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given or given by necessary implication.' Story, J., in Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 326, 4 L. ed. 97, 102. 'The government of the United States is one of delegated, limited, and enumerated powers.' United States v. Harris,  106 U.S. 629, 635 , 27 S. L. ed. 290, 292, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 601, 606.

Turning to the enumeration of the powers granted to Congress by the 8th section of the 1st article of the Constitu-

tion, it is enough to say that no one of them, by any implication, refers to the reclamation of arid lands. The last paragraph of the section which authorizes Congress to make all laws which shall be necessary to proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof, is not the delegation of a new and independent power, but simply provision for making effective the powers theretofore mentioned. The construction of that paragraph was precisely stated by Chief Justice Marshall in these words [4 Wheat. 421, 4 L. ed. 605]: 'We think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional,'-a statement which has become the settled rule of construction. From this and other declarations it is clear that the Constitution is not to be construed technically and narrowly, as an indictment, or even as a grant presumably against the interest of the grantor, and passing only that which is clearly included within its language, but as creating a system of government whose provisions are designed to make effective and operative all the governmental powers granted. Yet, while so construed, it still is true that no independent and unmentioned power passes to the national government or can rightfully be exercised by the Congress.

We must look beyond 8 for congressional authority over arid lands, and it is said to be found in the second paragraph of 3 of article 4, reading: 'The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging

to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state.'

The full scope of this paragraph has never been definitely settled. Primarily, at least, it is a grant of power to the United States of control over its property. That is implied by the words 'territory or other property.' It is true it has been referred to in some decisions as granting political and legislative control over the territories as distinguished from the states of the Union. It is unnecessary in the present case to consider whether the language justifies this construction. Certainly we have no disposition to limit or qualify the expressions which have heretofore fallen from this court in respect thereto. But clearly it does not grant to Congress any legislative control over the states, and must, so far as they are concerned, be limited to authority over the property belonging to the United States within their limits. Appreciating the force of this, counsel for the government relies upon 'the doctrine of sovereign and inherent power;' adding, 'I am aware that in advancing this doctrine I seem to challenge great decisions of the court, and I speak with deference.' His argument runs substantially along this line: All legislative power must be vested in either the state or the national government; no legislative powers belong to a state government other than those which affect solely the internal affairs of that state; consequently all powers which are national in their scope must be found vested in the Congress of the United States. But the proposition that there are legislative powers affecting the nation as a whole which belong to, although not expressed in the grant of powers, is in direct conflict with the doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers. That this is such a government clearly appears from the Constitution, independently of the Amendments, for otherwise there would be an instrument granting certain specified things made operative to grant other and distinct things. This natural construction of the original body of the Constitution is made absolutely certain

by the 10th Amendment. This Amendment, which was seemingly adopted with prescience of just such contention as the present, disclosed the widespread fear that the national government might, under the pressure of a supposed general welfare, attempt to exercise powers which had not been granted. With equal determination the framers intended that no such assumption should ever find justification in the organic act, and that if, in the future, further powers seemed necessary, they should be granted by the people in the manner they had provided for amending that act. It reads: 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.' The argument of counsel ignores the principal factor in this article, to wit, 'the people.' Its principal purpose was not the distribution of power between the United States and the states, but a reservation to the people of all powers not granted. The preamble of the Constitution declares who framed it,-'we, the people of the United States,' not the people of one state, but the people of all the states; and article 10 reserves to the people of all the states the powers not delegated to the United States. The powers affecting the internal affairs of the states not granted to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, and all powers of a national character which are not delegated to the national government by the Constitution are reserved to the people of the United States. The people who adopted the Constitution knew that in the nature of things they could not foresee all the questions which might arise in the future, all the circumstances which might call for the exercise of further national powers than those granted to the United States, and, after making provision for an amendment to the Constitution by which any needed additional powers would be granted, they reserved to themselves all powers not so delegated. This article 10 is not to be shorn of its meaning by any narrow or technical construction, but is to be considered fairly and

'We are not here confronted with a question of the extent of the powers of Congress, but one of the limitations imposed by the Constitution on its action, and it seems to us clear that the same rule and spirit of construction must also be recognized. If powers granted are to be taken as broadly granted and as carrying with them authority to pass those acts which may be reasonably necessary to carry them into full execution; in other words, if the Constitution in its grant of powers is to be so construed that Congress shall be able to carry into full effect the powers granted, it is equally imperative that, where prohibition or limitation is placed upon the power of Congress, that prohibition or limitation should be enforced in its spirit and to its entirety. It would be a strange rule of construction that language granting powers is to be liberally construed, and that language of restriction is to be narrowly and technically construed. Especially is this true when, in respect to grants of powers, there is, as heretofore noticed, the help found in the last clause of the 8th section, and no such helping clause in respect to prohibitions and limitations. The true spirit of constitutional interpretation in both directions is to give full, liberal construction to the language, aiming ever to show fidelity to the spirit and purpose.' liberally so as to give effect to its scope and meaning. As we said, construing an express limitation on the powers of Congress, in Fairbank v. United States,  181 U.S. 283, 288 , 45 S. L. ed. 862, 865, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648, 650:

This very matter of the reclamation of arid lands illustrates this: At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, within the known and conceded limits of the United States there were no large tracts of arid land, and nothing which called for any further action than that which might be taken by the legislature of the state in which any particular tract of such land was to be found; and the Constitution, therefore, makes no provision for a national control of the arid regions or their reclamation. But, as our national territory has been enlarged, we have within our borders extensive tracts of arid lands

which ought to be reclaimed, and it may well be that no power is adequate for their reclamation other than that of the national government. But, if no such power has been granted, none can be exercised.

'It may be observed that the purport of the previous acts is reflexively illustrated by the act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 388, chap. 1093, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1905, p. 349). That act appropriated the receipts from the sale and disposal of the public lands in certain states and territories It does not follow from this that the national government is entirely powerless in respect to this matter. These arid lands are largely within the territories, and over them, by virtue of the second paragraph of 3 of article 4, heretofore quoted, or by virtue of the power vested in the national government to acquire territory by treaties, Congress has full power of legislation, subject to no restrictions other than those expressly named in the Constitution, and, therefore, it may legislate in respect to all arid lands within their limits. As to those lands within the limits of the states, at least of the Western states, the national government is the most considerable owner and has power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting its property. We do not mean that its legislation can override state laws in respect to the general subject of reclamation. While arid lands are to be found mainly, if not only, in the Western and newer states, yet the powers of the national government within the limits of those states are the same (no greater and no less) than those within the limits of the original thirteen; and it would be strange if, in the absence of a definite grant of power, the national government could enter the territory of the states along the Atlantic and legislate in respect to improving, by irrigation or otherwise, the lands within their borders. Nor do we understand that hitherto Congress has acted in disregard to this limitation. As said by Mr. Justice White, delivering the opinion of the court in Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land & Irrig. Co.  188 U.S. 545, 554 , 47 S. L. ed. 588, 593, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 338, 341, after referring to previous legislation:

"Sec. 8. That nothing in this act shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any state or territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any state, or of the Federal government, or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the waters thereof: Provided, That the right to the use of the water acquired under the provisions of this act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right." to the construction of irrigation works for the reclamation of arid lands. the 8th section of the act is as follows:

'And since this court, in the case of The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 13 L. ed. 1058, has declared that the Great Lakes and other navigable waters of the country, above as well as below the flow of the tide, are, in the strictest sense, entitled to the denomination of navigable waters, and amenable to the admiralty jurisdiction, there seems to be no sound reasons for adhering to the old rule as to the proprietorship of the beds and shores of such But it is useless to pursue the inquiry further in this direction. It is enough for the purposes of this case that each state has full jurisdiction over the lands within its borders, including the beds of streams and other waters. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 10 L. ed. 997; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 11 L. ed. 565; Goodtitle ex dem. Pollard v. Kibbe, 9 How. 471, 13 L. ed. 220; Barney v. Keokuk,  94 U.S. 324 , 24 L. ed. 224; St. Louis v. Myers,  113 U.S. 566 , 28 L. ed. 1131, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 640; Packer v. Bird,  137 U.S. 661 , 34 L. ed. 819, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 210; Hardin v. Jordan,  140 U.S. 371 , 35 L. ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838; Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co.  142 U.S. 254 , 35 L. ed. 1004, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 173; Shively v. Bowlby,  152 U.S. 1 , 38 L. ed. 331, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 548; St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comrs.  168 U.S. 349 , 42 L. ed. 497, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157; Kean v. Calumet Canal & Improv. Co.  190 U.S. 452 , 47 L. ed. 1134, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651. In Barney v. Keokuk, supra, Mr. Justice Bradley said (p. 338, L. ed. p. 228):

waters. It properly belongs to the states by their inherent sovereignty, and the United States has wisely abstained from extending (if it could extend) its survey and grants beyond the limits of high water.'

'Such title being in the state, the lands are subject to state regulation and control, under the condition, however, of not interfering with the regulations which may be made by Congress with regard to public navigation and commerce. . . . Sometimes large areas so reclaimed are occupied by cities, and are put to other public or private uses, state control and ownership therein being supreme, subject only to the paramount authority of Congress in making regulations of commerce, and in subjecting the lands to the necessities and uses of commerce. . . . This right of the states to regulate and control the shores of tide waters, and the land under them, is the same as that which is exercised by the Crown in England. In this country the same rule has been extended to our great navigable lakes, which are treated as inland seas; and also, in some of the states, to navigable rivers, as the Mississippi, the Missouri, the Ohio, and, in Pennsylvania, to all the permanent rivers of the state; but it depends on the law of each state to what waters and to what extent this prerogative of the state over the lands under water shall be exercised.' In Hardin v. Jordan, supra, the same justice, after stating that the title to the shore and lands under water is in the state, added (pp. 381, 382, L. ed. p. 433, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 812):

It may determine for itself whether the common-law rule in respect to riparian rights or that doctrine which obtains in the arid regions of the West of the appropriation of waters for the purposes of irrigation shall control. Congress cannot enforce either rule upon any state. It is undoubtedly true that the early settlers brought to this country the common law of England, and that that common law throws light on the meaning and scope of the Constitution of the United States, and is also in many states expressly recognized as of controlling force in the absence of express statute. As said by Mr.

'In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 22 L. ed. 627; Ex parte Wilson,  114 U.S. 417, 422 , 29 S. L. ed. 89, 91, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935; Boyd v. United States,  116 U.S. 616, 624 , 625 S., 29 L. ed. 746, 748, 749, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524; Smith v. Alabama,  124 U.S. 465 , 31 L. ed. 508, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564. The language of the Constitution, as has been well said, could not be understood without reference to the common law. 1 Kent, Com. 336; Bradley, J., in Moore v. United States,  91 U.S. 270, 274 , 23 S. L. ed. 346, 347.' Justice Gray in United States v. Wong Kim Ark,  169 U.S. 649, 654 , 42 S. L. ed. 890, 893, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456, 459:

In the argument on the demurrer counsel for plaintiff endeavored to show that Congress had expressly imposed the common law on all this territory prior to its formation into states. See also the opinion of the Supreme Court of Kansas in Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 70 L.R.A. 971, 80 Pac. 571. But when the states of Kansas and Colorado were admitted into the Union they were admitted with the full powers of local sovereignty which belonged to other states (Pollard v. Hagan and Shively v. Bowlby, supra; Hardin v. Shedd,  190 U.S. 508, 519 , 47 S. L. ed. 1156, 1157, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 685), and Colorado, by its legislation, has recognized the right of appropriating the flowing waters to the purposes of irrigation. Now the question arises between two states, one recognizing generally the common- law rule of riparian rights and the other prescribing the doctrine of the public ownership of flowing water. Neither state can legislate for, or impose its own policy upon the other. A stream flows through the two and a controversy is presented as to the flow of that stream. It does not follow, however, that because Congress cannot determine the rule which shall control between the two states, or because neither state can enforce its own policy upon the other, that the controversy ceases to be one of a justiciable nature, or that there is no power which can take cognizance of the controversy and determine the relative rights of the two states. Indeed, the disagreement, coupled with its effect upon a stream passing through the two states, makes a matter for investigation and

'Properly understood, no exceptions can be taken to declarations of this kind. There is no body of Federal common law separate and distinct from the common law existing in the several states in the sense that there is a body of statute law enacted by Congress separate and distinct from the body of statute law enacted by the several states. But it is an entirely different thing to hold that there is no common law in force generally throughout the United States, and that the countless multitude of interestate commercial transactions are subject to no rules and durdened by no restrictions other than those expressed in the statutes of Congress. . . . Can it be that the great multitude of interstate commercial transactions are freed from the burdens created by the common law, as so defined, and are subject to no rule except that to be found in the statutes of Congress? We are clearly of opinion that this cannot be so, and that the principles of the common law are operative upon all interstate commercial transactions, except so far as they are modified by congressional enactment.' determination by this court. It has been said that there is no common law of the United States as distinguished from the common law of the several states. This contention was made in Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Call Pub. Co.  181 U.S. 92 , 45 L. ed. 765, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561, in which it was asserted that, as Congress, having sole jurisdiction over interstate commerce, had prescribed no rates for interstate telegraphic communications, there was no limit on the power of a telegraph company in respect thereto. After referring to the general contention, we paid (pp. 101, 102, L. ed. pp. 770, 771, Sup. Ct. Rep. pp. 564, 565):

'The common law includes those principles, usages, and rules of action applicable to the government and security of persons and property, which do not rest for their authority upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature.' What is the common law? Kent says (vol. 1, p. 471):

As it does not rest on any statute or other written declaration of the sovereign, there must, as to each principle thereof, be a first statement. Those statements are found in the deci-

'International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.' sions of courts, and the first statement presents the principle as certainly as the last. Multiplication of declarations merely adds certainty. For after all, the common law is but the accumulated expressions of the various judicial tribunals in their efforts to ascertain what is right and just between individuals in respect to private disputes. As Congress cannot make compacts between the states, as it cannot, in respect to certain matters, by legislation compel their separate action, disputes between them must be settled either by force or else by appeal to tribunals empowered to determine the right and wrong thereof. Force, under our system of government, is eliminated. The clear language of the Constitution vests in this court the power to settle those disputes. We have exercised that power in a variety of instances, determining in the several instances the justice of the dispute. Nor is our jurisdiction ousted, even if, because Kansas and Colorado are states sovereign and independent in local matters, the relations between them depend in any respect upon principles of international law. International law is no alien in this tribunal. In The Paquete Habana,  175 U.S. 677, 700 , 44 S. L. ed. 320, 328, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 290, 299, Mr. Justice Gray declared:

'Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a domestic, tribunal, we apply Federal law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the particular case may demand.' And in delivering the opinion in the demurrer in this case Chief Justice Fuller said (p. 146, L. ed. p. 846, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 560):

One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the states to each other, is that of equality of right. Each state stands on the same level with all the rest. It can impose its own legislation on no one of the others, and is bound to yield its own views to none. Yet, whenever, as in the case of Missouri v. Illinois, supra, the action of one state reaches, through the agency of natural laws, into the territory of another state,

the question of the extent and the limitations of the rights of the two states becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between them, and this court is called upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both and at the same time establish justice between them. In other words, through these successive disputes and decisions this court is practically building up what may not improperly be called interstate common law. This very case presents a significant illustration. Before either Kansas or Colorado was settled the Arkansas river was a stream running through the territory which now composes these two states. Arid lands abound in Colorado. Reclamation is possible only by the application of water, and the extreme contention of Colorado is that it has a right to appropriate all the waters of this stream for the purposes of irrigating its soil and making more valuable its own territory. But the appropriation of the entire flow of the river would naturally tend to make the lands along the stream in Kansas less arable. It would be taking from the adjacent territory that which had been the customary natural means of preserving its arable character. On the other hand, the possible contention of Kansas, that the flowing water in the Arkansas must, in accordance with the extreme doctrine of the common law of England, be left to flow as it was wont to flow, no portion of it being appropriated in Colorado for the purposes of irrigation, would have the effect to perpetuate a desert condition in portions of Colorado beyond the power of reclamation. Surely here is a dispute of a justiciable nature which might and ought to be tried and determined. If the two states were absolutely independent nations it would be settled by treaty or by force. Neither of these ways being practicable, it must be settled by decision of this court.

It will be perceived that Kansas asserts a pecuniary interest as the owner of certain tracts along the banks of the Arkansas and as the owner of the bed of the stream. We need not stop to consider what right such private ownership of property might give.

'As will be perceived, the court there ruled that the mere fact that a state had no pecuniary interest in the controversy would not defeat the original jurisdiction of this court, which might be invoked by the state as parens patrice, trustee, guardian, or representative of all or a considerable portion of its citizens; and that the threatened pollution of the waters of a river flowing between states, under the authority of one of them, thereby putting the health and comfort of the citizens of the other in jeopardy, presented a cause of action justiciable under the Constitution.

'In the case before us, the state of Kansas files her bill as representing and on behalf of the citizens, as well as in vindication of her alleged rights as an individual owner, and seeks relief in respect of being deprived of the waters of the river accustomed to flow through and across the state, and the consequent destruction of the property of herself and of her citizens and injury to their health and comfort. The action complained of is state action, and not the action of state officers in abuse or excess of their powers.' In deciding this case on demurrer we said, referring to the opinion in Missouri v. Illinois (p. 142, L. ed. p. 844, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 558):

It is the state of Kansas which invokes the action of this court, charging that, through the action of Colorado, a large portion of its territory is threatened with disaster. In this respect it is in no manner evading the provisions of the 11th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. It is not acting directly and solely for the benefit of any individual citizen to protect his riparian rights. Beyond its property rights it has an interest as a state in this large tract of land bordering on the Arkansas river. Its prosperity affects the general welfare of the state. The controversy rises, therefore, above a mere question of local private right and involves a matter of state interest, and must be considered from that standpoint. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.  206 U.S. 230 , 51 L. ed. 1038, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 618.

This changes in some respects the scope of our inquiry. It is not limited to the simple matter of whether any portion of the

waters of the Arkansas is withheld by Colorado. We must consider the effect of what has been done upon the conditions in the respective states, and so adjust the dispute upon the basis of equality of rights as to secure as far as possible to Colorado the benefits of irrigation without deprivi