U.S. Supreme Court

LARSON V. DOMESTIC & FOREIGN COMMERCE CORPORATION , 337 U.S. 682 (1949)

337 U.S. 682

LARSONv.

DOMESTIC & FOREIGN COMMERCE CORPORATION.

No. 31.

Argued Nov. 12, 1948.

Decided June 27, 1949.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 10, 1949.

See .[ Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation 337 U.S. 682 (1949) ]

Mr. H. G. Morison, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. T. Peter Ansberry, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Chief Justice VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit was brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by the Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation against Robert M. Littlejohn, the then head of the War Assets Administration. [^{Footnote 1} ] The complaint alleged that the Administration had sold certain surplus coal to the plaintiff; that the Administrator refused to deliver the coal but, on the contrary, had entered into a new contract to sell it to others. The prayer was for an injunction prohibiting the Administrator from selling or delivering the coal to any one other than the plaintiff and for a declaration that the sale to the plaintiff was valid and the sale to the second purchaser invalid.

A temporary restraining order was issued ex parte. At the subsequent hearing on the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that the court did not have jurisdiction because the suit was one against the United

States. The motion was granted. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the jurisdictional capacity of the court depended on whether or not title to the coal had passed. [^{Footnote 2} ] Since this was also one of the questions on the merits, it remanded the case for trial. We granted certiorari, 333 U.S. 872.3

The controversy on the merits concerns the interpretation to be given to the contract of sale. The War Assets Administration construed the contract as requiring the plaintiff to deposit funds to pay for the coal in advance and, when an unsatisfactory letter of credit was offered in place of a deposit, it considered that the contract was breached. The respondent, on the other hand, construed the contract as requiring payment only on delivery of the documents covering the coal shipment. In its view, it was not obliged to deposit any funds in advance of shipment and, therefore, had not breached the contract by failing to do so.

A second question, related to but different from the question of breach, was whether legal title to the coal had passed to the responden when the contract was made. If the contract required the deposit of funds then, of course, title could not pass until the contract terms were complied with. If, on the other hand, the contract required payment only on the delivery of documents, a question remained as to whether title nevertheless passed at the time the contract was made.

Since these questions were not decided by the courts below we do not pass on them here. They are important only insofar as they illuminate the basis on which it

was claimed that the district court had jurisdiction over the suit. It was not alleged that the contract for the sale of the coal was a contract with the officer personally. [^{Footnote 4} ] The basis of the action, on the contrary, was that a contract had been entered into with the United States. Nor was it claimed that the Administrator had any personal interest in this coal or, indeed, that he himself had taken any wrongful action. The complaint was directed against him because of his official function as chief of the War Assets Administration. [^{Footnote 5} ] It asked for an injunction against him in that capacity, and against 'his agents, assistants, deputies and employees and all persons acting or assuming to act under their direction.' The relief sought was, in short, relief against the Administration for wrongs allegedly committed by subordinate officials in that Administration. The question presented to the courts below was whether such an injunction was barred by the sovereign's immunity from suit.

Before answering that question it is perhaps advisable to state clearly what is and what is not involved. There is not involved any question of the immunization of Government officers against responsibility for their wrongful actions. If those actions are such as to create a personal liability, whether sounding in tort or in contract, the fact that the officer is an instrumentality of the sovereign does not, of course, forbid a court from taking jurisdiction over a suit against him. Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. Emergency Fleet Corp., 1922,  258 U.S. 549, 567 , 388. As was said in Brady

v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 1943,  317 U.S. 575, 580 , 428, the principle that an agent is liable for his own torts 'is an ancie