RESPONSE OF CAROLINA, INC., Florida Computer Response, Inc., Datatron Corporation, Response of Colorado, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LEASCO RESPONSE, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

LEASCO RESPONSE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 75-3052. United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 2, 1976.

J. Kirk Wood, R. Benjamine Reid, Joseph W. Womack, Miami, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Anthony F. Phillips, Howard C. Buschner, III, and Philippe M. Salomon of counsel, Willkie Fair & Gallagher, New York City, for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before DYER, SIMPSON and RONEY, Circuit Judges. DYER, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of Leasco Response, Inc. (Leasco) in a suit brought by four of its former franchisees for alleged violations of the antitrust laws. In a bifurcated trial, the district court directed a verdict for Leasco at the close of franchisees' case. The franchisees, Response of Carolina (Carolina), Florida Computer Response (Miami), Datatron Corporation (Datatron) and Response of Colorado (Denver) alleged that Leasco imposed territorial restrictions on their sale of computer time-sharing services and that Leasco tied the sale of the franchise to the lease of computer hardware from Leasco. The question presented here is whether, particularly in light of the bifurcated trial procedure, the district court erred in directing a verdict for Leasco, having found that there was no substantial evidence under the standard of Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 5 Cir. 1969,  411 F.2d 365 (en bane), to establish Leasco's antitrust liability. We affirm.

I.

Leasco entered the computer time-sharing business in 1969. Using a modified Hewlett-Packard 2000A central processing unit as the core of its system, it opened service branches in several major cities in the United States. The computer system was called "Response I." In 1970, Leasco decided to franchise the Response I system. Its first franchise was opened in September, 1970, in Phoenix, Arizona. Two of the plaintiffs, Carolina and Datatron, began operations in Charlotte, North Carolina, and Louisville, Kentucky, respectively in June, 1971. The Denver plaintiff opened its doors in September, 1971, and the Miami plaintiff started in March, 1972.

The franchise agreement was called the Data Network Contract (DNC). While each of the four contracts involved in this case contained slight differences, their pertinent provisions are the same for all plaintiffs.

According to the DNC, Leasco granted to its franchisee the exclusive right to market

Response Service^{Footnote 1} using franchise-controlled computer hardware, together with a license to use any rights that Leasco may have in the name "Response" within an area of primary responsibility.

The area of primary responsibility (APR) was described in an exhibit to each DNC, listing the counties within the area. Leasco agreed not to offer Response Service to any other person in the area except that Leasco was permitted to sell and solicit the sale of its time-sharing service to companies having offices both within and without franchisees' areas, so called "national accounts." Each franchisee agreed to "diligently promote the sale of Response Service" throughout the area of primary responsibility.

The DNC did not prohibit extra-territorial sales by franchisees. It provided for royalty payments to Leasco of 15 percent of monthly gross sales to customers within the area. However, the royalty was increased to 70 percent for sales to customers outside of the area.^{Footnote 2} It is this paragraph of the

DNC which gives rise to the claimed territorial restriction. "Response Service" provided under the DNC did not include computer hardware,³ although it referred to a Hewlett/Packard computer.

4

In Paragraph 4 of the DNC Leasco stated its willingness to lease to franchisees the items of equipment listed in Exhibit B to the contract, 5 according to the terms of the lease also incorporated in Exhibit B. If this offer was accepted, Leasco agreed to set up and install the Response Equipment without charge on the franchisee's premises. Each franchisee signed an equipment lease for a term of 60 months. ^{Footnote 6}

As is explained more fully, infra, franchisees' tying argument centers around the lease of this equipment. On June 21, 1973, Leasco filed suit against Carolina in a North Carolina state court to collect unpaid rentals, maintenance fees, and other amounts due under the lease and to recover possession of the leased equipment. One day later, Carolina filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Leasco alleging that Leasco violated the antitrust laws ^{Footnote 7} by (1) the imposition of territorial restrictions on the area within which Carolina might sell Response Service,

by exacting 70 percent of monthly gross sales to customers outside of Carolina's area of primary responsibility; (2) price fixing; (3) discriminatorily favoring its branches over its franchises; and (4) attempted monopolization. ^{Footnote 8}

On August 3, 1973, Miami filed suit against Leasco on similar grounds. Datatron's complaint followed on August 16, 1973, and Colorado's was filed on August 20, 1973. ^{Footnote 9}

No allegations of a tying arrangement were made in any of the complaints. On April 16, 1974, the cases were consolidated. Extensive discovery was had by all parties in 1973 and the first nine months of 1974. On October 15, 1974, the parties filed a pre-trial stipulation wherein they agreed on no issues of fact or law. However, in this document both franchisees and Leasco stated that a tying claim was an issue to be considered at trial. ^{Footnote 10}

On October 18,1974, at a pre-trial conference the district court stated that it was its disposition "to try liability first and then go to damages," using the same jury. ^{Footnote 11}

objected to this bifurcation procedure, but there was no discussion of the objection by the district court. Later in the conference, franchisees' counsel asked whether an order would be entered as to the separation of the trial into two stages. The district court stated simply that liability would be tried first. There was no other discussion by the district court and counsel of this decision anywhere in the pre-trial record.

On November 11, 1974, the trial commenced and plaintiffs concluded presentation of their evidence on February 20, 1975.

On February 28, 1975, the district court heard arguments on Leasco's motion for a directed verdict on the antitrust and fraud counts of the complaints. ^{Footnote 12}

On March 3, 1975, the district court granted Leasco's motion with respect to all antitrust issues raised by franchisees. It denied the motion with respect to the fraud issues and the trial proceeded. After a jury verdict for Leasco on the fraud counts ^{Footnote 13} the district court entered its final judgment in favor of Leasco.

Franchisees' motions for a new trial asserting error in directing a verdict for Leasco on the antitrust claims were subsequently denied and they appealed. They address their appeal solely to the propriety of the district court's directed verdict for Leasco on the territorial restriction and tying claims.

Leasco

II.

The district court found that "firm and resolute" or, at least, some measure of enforcement of a vertical territorial restriction is necessary to render it actionable.

Since it found no evidence of enforcement, it directed a verdict in Leasco's favor on

RESPONSE OF CAROLINA, INC this alleged antitrust violation. Franchisees contend that this was error.

Section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1, provides that "every contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce ... is ... illegal." "Every" is not meant literally; rather the standard of reasonableness has been adopted to judge the lawfulness of the restraint, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 1911,  221 U.S. 1, 66, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619; Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 1918,  246 U.S. 231, 238, 38 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed. 683.

Certain practices have such a "pernicious effect on competition," Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 1958, 356 U.S. 1, 5, 78 S.Ct. 514, 2 L.Ed.2d 545, that they are considered to be per se violations of Section one. ^{Footnote 14}

Vertical territorial restraints were excluded from that category initially, White Motor Co. v. United States, 1963,  372 U.S. 253, 83 S.Ct. 696, 9 L.E,d.2d 738, but later were included, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 1967,  388 U.S. 365, 87 S.Ct. 1856, 18 L.Ed.2d 1249.

In White Motor, the Supreme Court was faced for the first time with territorial and customer restrictions. White Motor's agreement with its distributors and dealers expressly limited the territory within which and the customers, to whom they might sell trucks and parts. The Supreme Court held that the legality of these vertical restraints should be determined only after a trial since it did not know enough about the "economic or business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge" to be certain of their purpose or effect. "We need to know more than We do abotit the actual impact of these arrangements on competition to decide whether they have such a 'pernicious effect on competition and lack . . . any re1307 (1976) deeming virtue' . . . and therefore should be classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act." 372 U.S. at 263, 83 S.Ct. at 702.

Four years later in Schwinn, the legality of such restraints suffered the opposite fate. Schwinn had two principal methods of selling its bicycles. It sold to retailers by means of consignment or agency arrangements with 22 distributors under the socalled Schwinn Plan which involved direct shipment by Schwinn to the retailer with Schwinn invoicing the retailer, extending credit, and paying a commission to the distributor taking the order. And it sold bicycles to distributors who maintained an inventory to supply retailers with emergency and "fill-in" requirements. ^{Footnote 15}

Schwinn assigned specific territories on an exclusive basis to each distributor. It instructed each distributor to sell only to franchised Schwinn retailers in their respective territories. Each franchised retailer was to purchase only from or through the distributor authorized to serve his particular area and was to sell only to consumers and not to unfranchised retailers.

The Court held that where a manufacturer sells products to his distributor subject to territorial or customer restrictions upon resale, a per se violation of the Sherman Act results. "Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it." 388 U.S. at 379, 87 S.Ct. at 1865. Hence, Schwinn was enjoined from limiting the freedom of its distributors and retailers who buy products from Schwinn to dispose of the products "where and to whomever they choose." Id. at 378, 87 S.Ct. at 1865.

With respect to consignment or agency sales by Schwinn the Court held that, under the rule of reason, where Schwinn retains all indicia of ownership, including title, dominion, and risk of loss and so long as the dealers in question are indistinguishable in function from agents or salesmen, the vertical territorial restriction was not an "unreasonable" restraint of trade. 388 U.S. at 381, 87 S.Ct. at 1856.

The critical element of a "contract, combination, or conspiracy," easily found in White Motor because of the express contractual territorial restriction, was not clearly identified by the Court in Schwinn. The Court did not quote the language of any of the agreements between Schwinn and its distributors and retailers so there does not appear to have been an express contractual restriction. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion supports this view when it states that Schwinn's distribution policy was "implemented largely through request and persuasion by Schwinn." 388 U.S. at 385, 87 S.Ct. at 1868. And the majority opinion made clear that there were no horizontal overtones to the restrictions in issue: [W]e are dealing here with a vertical restraint embodying the unilateral program of a single manufacturer. We are not dealing with a combination . of distributors . . . . We are not dealing with a "division" of territory in the sense of an allocation by and among the distributors, . . . or an agreement among distributors to restrict their competition . . . . We are here concerned with a truly vertical arrangement, raising the fundamental question of the degree to which a manufacturer may not only select the customers to whom he will sell, but also allocate territories for resale and confine access to his product to selected, or franchised, retailers. 388 U.S. at 378, 87 S.Ct. at 1865.

With respect to transactions in which distributors purchased bicycles for resale, at least, the district court expressly found a conspiracy between the distributors and Schwinn to restrain trade. 388 U.S. at 371, 87 S.Ct. 1856. However, the district court's finding of a conspiracy did not embrace agency or consignment sales by distributors. And with respect to the restrictions on retailers, the district court stated that the Schwinn franchising program " 'was conceived, hatched and born into life . in the minds of the Schwinn officials,' and agreed that 'the action was unilateral in nature.' " 388 U.S. at 391, 87 S.Ct. at 1871, fn. 12 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

The Court does not tell us in Schwinn the source of the necessary contract, combination or conspiracy with respect to the territorial restrictions on distributors when acting as agents or consignees and the customer restrictions on retailers. According to Justice Stewart's dissent, the "firm and resolute enforcement" language of the majority opinion was intended to satisfy'in his view, unsatisfactorily'the Sherman Act jurisdictional requirement of an agreement for these two practices. 388 U.S. at 391, 87 S.Ct. 1856, fn. 12. The district court had rejected the government's contentions that Schwinn in fact cancelled the franchises of some retailers because of sales to unauthorized customers and that distributors had been cut off because of sales to unauthorized customers in violation of territorial limitations. The government argued to the Court that these findings were clearly erroneous. The Court stated: In any event, it is clear and entirely consistent with the District Court's findings that Schwinn has been "firm and resolute" in insisting upon observance of territorial and customer limitations by its bicycle distributors and upon confining sales by franchised retailers to consumers, and that Schwinn's "firmness" in these respects was grounded upon the communicated danger of termination.

Our analysis will embrace this conclusion, rather than the finding which is urged by the Government and which was refused by the trial court that Schwinn actually terminated retail franchises or cut off distributors for the suggested reasons.

388 U.S. at 372, 87 S.Ct. at 1862.

Thus, despite the unilateral nature of the distribution policies of Schwinn, Schwinn's

enforcement of the policies acquiesced in by both the franchised retailers and wholesale distributors amounted to a contract, combination, or conspiracy for Sherman Act purposes. ^{Footnote 16}

Albrecht v. Herald Company, 1968,  390 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 869, 19 L.Ed.2d 998, confirms this view. Albrecht was a newspaper carrier for respondent newspaper company. All carriers had exclusive territories subject to termination if prices exceeded respondent's advertised suggested maximum price. Albrecht adhered to the advertised price for some time but then raised his prices. Respondent objected to no avail and later wrote Albrecht to inform him that it was writing to subscribers on his route to offer them the newspaper at the lower price. Respondent also hired a circulation company to engage in a solicitation of customers along Albrecht's route. Respondent continued to sell newspapers to Albrecht but warned him it would stop doing so if he continued to overcharge. In addition, resident found a carrier, Kroner, to deliver papers to respondent's customers, most of whom were previously Albrecht's. Albrecht sued charging a combination between respondent and Albrecht's customers or the circulation company or Kroner. The jury found for respondent and a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied. The court of appeals affirmed the denial in part on the ground that respondent's action was unilateral.

Relying on United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 45-47, 80 S.Ct. 503, ^{Footnote 17} Supreme Court reversed, finding a combination between respondent, the circulation company, and Kroner to force Albrecht to conform to the advertised retail price. In a footnote, the Court stated that under Parke, Davis, Albrecht could have claimed a combination between respondent and himself, "at least as of the day he unwillingly complied with respondent's advertised price." "Likewise," said the Court citing Schwinn's discussion of firm and resolute enforcement, "he might successfully have claimed that respondent had combined with other carriers because the firmly enforced price policy applied to all carriers, most of whom acquiesced in it." 390 U.S. at 150, 88 S.Ct. at 872, fn. 6. Reliance on Schwinn makes it clear that the firm and resolute language in that opinion was meant to show the existence of an agreement.

The post-Schwinn treatment of the "firm and resolute enforcement" language of the Court has followed an erratic course. We chart it to explain our holdings, infra, on the existence of a violation here.

Jane. Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 2 Cir. 1968,  396 F.2d 398, cert, denied, 393 U.S. 938, 89 S.Ct. 303, 21 L.Ed. 275, involved an express contractual customer restriction where the "retailer" agreed to sell certain "commodities" only to "consumers for use." Plaintiffs argued that this was a per se violation of the Sherman Act § 1. The jury found that there was no agreement on customer restrictions and the court upheld this finding saying that "firm and resolute" inthe sistence on compliance with the restriction

was necessary before a violation could be 18 found.

Id. at 406.

Three years later, in Beverage Distributors, Inc. v. Olympia Brewing Company, 9 Cir. 1971,  440 F.2d 21, cert, denied, 403 U.S. 906, 91 S.Ct. 2209, 29 L.Ed.2d 682, plaintiff beer distributor argued that defendant brewing company had imposed territorial restrictions upon the resale of its beer. However, the distributorship agreement contained no reference to territorial restrictions. Hence, plaintiff was faced with the same dilemma as the government in Schwinn: the need to show a contract, combination or conspiracy. The jury found that there was none of these and the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict, concluding that "if there was any restraint on plaintiff it was self imposed." Id. at 30-31.

Next, in Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 10 Cir. 1973,  472 F.2d 637, cert, denied, 411 U.S. 987, 93 S.Ct. 2274, 36 L.Ed.2d 965, plaintiff and defendant Thompson were competing wholesale distributors of defendant Febco's products. Febco then entered into an exclusive distributorship with Thompson which authorized Thompson "to sell within the following territory (Colorado and some adjacent areas)." As a result of this arrangement, plaintiff could not buy directly from Febco and had to buy from Thompson at a lesser discount than it had been receiving from Febco. The court stated that the territorial limitation did not mention outside sales and the testimony was that outside sales could have been made, though none had been. It concluded that the limitation created no more than an area of primary responsibility, ^{Footnote 19} and, relying on Janel Sales Corp., supra, ^{Footnote 20} the court found no firm and resolute enforcement of any territorial restriction.

About a year later, in Good Investment Promotions, Inc. v. Corning Glass Works, 6 Cir. 1974,  493 F.2d 891, alleged customer restrictions were in issue. The district court had granted a summary judgment to plaintiff relying on the per se rule of Schwinn. The court of appeals reversed saying, in part, that the record is "devoid of any information from which it may be determined that ' . . . firm and resolute [insistence] upon observance of ... customer limitations' was required by Corning, such as was the situation in Schwinn." Id. at 893. It is unclear from the opinion whether the court was treating the firm and resolute language as necessary to establish an agreement in the absence of a contractual restriction or whether it was treating it as a defense to the charge of violation.

In Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 5 Cir. 1975,  506 F.2d 934, we were faced with an express territorial restriction in which a beer distributor promised to conduct his distribution exclusively within a prescribed territory. Referring to the "firm and resolute" language as an "exception" we did not consider its significance because it was "apparent" that Coors had been firm and resolute in enforcing the territorial restrictions. Id. at 944.

RESPONSE OF CAROLINA, INC

Four months later the Eighth Circuit decided Reed Brothers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 8 Cir. 1975,  525 F.2d 486, cert, denied, 423 U.S. 1055, 96 S.Ct. 787, 46 L.Ed.2d 645 which involved (1) an area of primary responsibility clause, (2) a shipping and pickup policy which provided that deliveries would only be made to destinations within the APR and pick-ups would be accepted only at Monsanto warehouses within the ordering distributor's APR and (3) a rebate program whereby a distributor would receive a rebate on all Monsanto herbicides sold directly to retailers (as opposed to wholesalers or discounters). The jury found for plaintiff wholesaler. ^{Footnote 21}

However, the district court granted Monsanto's motion for a judgment n. o. v. because there was insufficient evidence of a contract, combination or conspiracy between Monsanto and its distributors to restrict the sale of herbicides to retailers in assigned territories. Monsanto's attempt to defend this position failed. Relying on Parke, Davis & Co., supra, the court of appeals stated that Monsanto's "legitimate" APR contract formed the base for an illegitimate agreement to restrict territorial and customer sales. It held that there was sufficient evidence to show that Monsanto firmly and resolutely enforced territorial restrictions by means of its shipping and pick-up policy, 525 F.2d at 495-96. In addition to this evidence "relating to the way in which Monsanto's shipping policy change acted as a coercive tool for enforcing its primary area of responsibility contract," the court found "clear evidence" that its rebate program was a "cooperative" one amounting to a contract, combination or conspiracy, 525 F.2d at 496-97. Therefore, the court upheld the jury's finding. Cf. Beverage Distributors, Inc. v. Olympic Brewing Co., supra. The Court went on to hold that the conflicting evidence in the record as to whether the effect of the agreement was to prohibit distributors from selling to Reed inside or outside of assigned territories, /. e., to restrain trade, was for the jury to weigh and that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that "Monsanto made rebate policies and enforced its 'area of primary responsibility' contracts through shipping policies which had the effect of restricting its distributors in the resale of its products." Id. at 498. Cf. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., N.D.Cal.1974, 383 F.Supp. 1346, 1368-69.

The Reed court properly used the firm and resolute language to support a finding of an agreement. This was also done in World of Sleep v. Stearns & Foster Co., 10 Cir. 1975,  525 F.2d 40, but with the opposite result. Defendant sold bedding products to plaintiff in Denver. There was no contract or agreement of any kind involved. Plaintiff opened a store in Atlanta and requested that defendant sell to it there. Defendant refused, citing its loyalty to another department store in Atlanta. Hence, plaintiff began to ship defendant's products from its Denver store to its Atlanta store. After an unavailing protest, defendant stopped selling bedding products to plaintiff. The plaintiff sued and the jury found for defendant. The court interpreted the per se rule of Schwinn as follows: "where a manufacturer . . . sells his product to a distributor . . . and in connection with such sale 'firmly and resolutely' subjects the distributor to territorial restrictions upon resale, whether by 'explicit agreement or silent combination or understanding with his vendee', a per se violation of the Sherman Act results." Id. at 44. The court properly equated "firm and resolute enforcement" with the Section one requirement of an agreement despite the Tenth Circuit's earlier ambiguous decision in Colorado Pump & Supply Co., supra. ^{Footnote 22}

The Tenth Circuit decided Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 10 Cir. 1975,  524 F.2d 1054, cert, denied, 425 U.S. 912, 96 S.Ct. 1508, 47 L.Ed.2d 762, four days later which involved an agreement containing "clear restrictions

on the area within which plaintiff could sell." Id. at 1057. Although an apparent contractual resale restriction existed, the court, notwithstanding what appears to be a clear holding in World of Sleep, relied on Colorado Pump and Jane. Sales in holding that there must be firm and resolute enforcement action "in addition to contractual provisions for territorial restrictions," Id. at 1058, before an antitrust violation exists. In our decision in Eastex Aviation, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 5 Cir. 1975,  522 F.2d 1299, which involved explicit contractual customer restrictions on resale of S & H green stamps, we characterized the "firm and resolute" cases as decisional exceptions to Schwinn but did not analyze their meaning because we found that the restrictions were enforced. Id. at 1307. Finally, in Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 3 Cir. 1976,  531 F.2d 92, cert, denied ---------------, 96 S.Ct. 2649, 49 L.Ed.2d 387, 44 L.W. 3714, a manufacturer of electronic equipment imposed explicit territorial restrictions by contract upon plaintiff distributor. The court upheld the jury's finding of a per se violation of the Sherman Act under Schwinn, once it found that there was enough evidence (1) to show that plaintiff purchased goods for resale and (2) to enable a jury to find that defendants enforced their territorial policy. The decision is complicated somewhat by an alternative holding that a horizontal division of markets existed "even if the Schwinn prohibition of vertical restraints were not dispositive." Id. at 104. In our view, none of these cases have analytically dealt with the difference between Schwinn's territorial "restriction" and various post-Schwinn "limitations" and the importance of an express agreement containing either the restriction or limitation. Schwinn's territorial "restriction" absolutely barred distributors from making extra-territorial sales. However, because this restriction was not contractually created, the Court determined that a contract, combination or conspiracy existed because of Schwinn's firm and resolute enforcement of the restrictions and the distributors' inferable acquiescence therein.

U.S.

Where a territorial or customer "restriction" is created by contract, the Sherman Act's Section one jurisdictional requirement is met and a per se violation exists whether or not the restriction has been enforced, much less firmly and resolutely enforced, unless it is otherwise sheltered by a decisional exception to SchwinnP Hence, we cannot subscribe to the reasoning of cases like Janel Sales and Redd.2*

However, most post-Schwinn vertical restraints, not surprisingly, have taken the form of territorial "limitations": arrangements which do not bar extra-territorial sales but may inhibit them. Where these limitations are contractually created, see Colorado Pump & Supply Co., supra, the "firm and resolute enforcement" language of Schwinn has no relevance to their legality. ^{Footnote 25}

We turn now to the correctness of the district court's directed verdict for Leasco on the existence of an antitrust violation. The district court held that "some measure of enforcement of a vertical territorial restriction, at least in a franchise context, must take place to render such a restriction actionable." Finding no evidence of enforcement, it directed a verdict for Leasco. As the foregoing discussion makes clear, this holding was error. ^{Footnote 26}

There was a contract between the parties containing a vertical limitation accompanied by a disparate royalty for inside and outside-area sales. Proof of enforcement was not necessary to show the existence of an agreement as it was in Schwinn. The question which should have been asked is whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the franchisees, there was evidence "of such quality and weight that reasonable men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions," Boeing Co. v. Shipman, supra, 411 F.2d at 374, to create a jury question on whether the Leasco APR clause and the 70 percent royalty on outside sales resulted in fact in the imposition of territorial restrictions on the sale of computer time by its franchisees. ^{Footnote 27}

We hold that there was. In our view, these contract terms were sufficient to create a jury question. The APR clause itself is unobjectionable. However, the disparity between the 15 percent royalty on inside area sales and 70 percent on outside sales was so great ^{Footnote 28} that, taken together with the APR, a jury could infer that territorial restrictions were being imposed by Leasco. ^{Footnote 29}

There was other evidence to support this inference. Leasco inter-office memoranda stated that the royalty payment of 70 percent served the purpose of deterring or dissuading outside sales. The former Leasco Director of Finance testified that Harris, one of the architects of the Leasco franchise system, told him that the purpose of the 70 percent royalty was to dissuade the franchisees from going out of their territory. And at least with respect to Datatron there was proffered testimony that it would take a loss on any sale it made outside of its