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MISSION DRY CORP. v. SEVEN-UP CO

Jurisdiction: United States Court of Customs
Decision date: no Date

empty empty empty empty empty (12) visits
U. S. V. U. S. GYPSUM CO.

Jurisdiction: U.S. Supreme Court
Decision date: Monday, 8 March 1948

empty empty empty empty empty (499) visits
MCCOMB V. JACKSONVILLE PAPER CO.

Jurisdiction: U.S. Supreme Court
Decision date: Monday, 14 February 1949

empty empty empty empty empty (43) visits
UNITED STATES v. LOEW'S INC.

Jurisdiction: U.S. Supreme Court
Decision date: Monday, 5 November 1962

empty empty empty empty empty (82) visits
WORLD CARPETS v. DICK LITTRELL'S NEW WORLD CARPETS

Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Decision date: Monday, 8 February 1971

empty empty empty empty empty (23) visits
ANDERSON v. BESSEMER CITY

Certiorari denied by 519 U.S. 863

Jurisdiction: U.S. Supreme Court
Decision date: Tuesday, 19 March 1985

empty empty empty empty empty (952) visits
KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN v. DIVERSIFIED PACKAGING

Affirming by 376 F. Supp. 1136

Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Decision date: Friday, 25 March 1977

empty empty empty empty empty (36) visits
WESTERN ELEC. CO. v. MILGO ELECTRONIC CORP.

Certiorari denied by 439 U.S. 895

Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Decision date: Monday, 6 March 1978

empty empty empty empty empty (8) visits
SEABROOK FOODS v. BAR-WELL FOODS LTD

Jurisdiction: United States Court of Customs
Decision date: Thursday, 22 December 1977

empty empty empty empty empty (15) visits
JAMES BURROUGH LIMITED and Kobrand Corporation v. SIGN OF the BEEFEATER

Jurisdiction: Seventh Circuit
Decision date: Wednesday, 1 March 1978

empty empty empty empty empty (15) visits
DALLAS COWBOYS v. PUSSYCAT CINEMA

Jurisdiction: Second Circuit
Decision date: Tuesday, 14 August 1979

empty empty empty empty empty (119) visits
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND v. ALEXANDER

Certiorari denied by 449 U.S. 919

Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Decision date: Monday, 24 March 1980

empty empty empty empty empty (14) visits
AMSTAR CORP. v. DOMINO'S PIZZA

Certiorari denied by 449 U.S. 899
Certiorari denied by 449 U.S. 985
Certiorari denied by 9 U.S. 899

Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Decision date: Tuesday, 8 April 1980

empty empty empty empty empty (69) visits
SOWECO v. SHELL OIL CO

Certiorari denied by 450 U.S. 981

Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Decision date: Friday, 30 May 1980

empty empty empty empty empty (31) visits
EXXON CORP. v. TEXAS MOTOR EXCHANGE OF HOUSTON

Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Decision date: Wednesday, 22 October 1980

empty empty empty empty empty (104) visits
SUN BANKS OF FLA. v. SUN FED. SAV.

Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Decision date: Monday, 20 July 1981

empty empty empty empty empty (33) visits
SUN-FUN PRODUCTS v. SUNTAN RESEARCH

Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Decision date: Thursday, 17 September 1981

empty empty empty empty empty (39) visits
CHEVRON CHEMICAL CO. v. VOLUNTARY PURCHASING GROUPS

Certiorari denied by 102 S.Ct. 2947
Certiorari denied by 457 U.S. 1126

Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Decision date: Friday, 23 October 1981

empty empty empty empty empty (46) visits
BONNER v. CITY OF PRICHARD

Vacated by 121 S.Ct. 471
Certiorari denied by 402 U.S. 976
Certiorari denied by 423 U.S. 1087
Enforced by 430 U.S. 817
Certiorari denied by 451 U.S. 1019
Modified by 678 F.2d 547
Overruled by by 804 F.2d 1537
Overruled by by 938 F.2d 1255

Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit
Decision date: Tuesday, 3 November 1981

empty empty empty empty empty (115) visits
SAFEWAY STORES v. SAFEWAY DISCOUNT DRUGS

Certiorari denied by 457 U.S. 1126

Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit
Decision date: Monday, 10 May 1982

empty empty empty empty empty (30) visits
ORIGINAL APPALACHIAN ARTWORKS v. TOY LOFT

Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit
Decision date: Friday, 3 September 1982

empty empty empty empty empty (124) visits
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH v. CHAMPION PRODUCTS INC.

Certiorari denied by 459 U.S. 1087

Jurisdiction: Third Circuit
Decision date: Thursday, 12 August 1982

empty empty empty empty empty (7) visits
EXXON CORP. v. HUMBLE EXPLORATION CO.

Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Decision date: Monday, 10 January 1983

empty empty empty empty empty (19) visits
JOHN H. HARLAND CO. v. CLARKE CHECKS

Certiorari denied by 493 U.S. 1075

Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit
Decision date: Monday, 8 August 1983

empty empty empty empty empty (168) visits
JELLIBEANS v. SKATING CLUBS OF GEORGIA

Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit
Decision date: Monday, 3 October 1983

empty empty empty empty empty (20) visits
BROOKS SHOE MFG. CO. v. SUAVE SHOE CORP

Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit
Decision date: Friday, 7 October 1983

empty empty empty empty empty (21) visits
CITIBANK v. CITIBANC GROUP

Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit
Decision date: Thursday, 16 February 1984

empty empty empty empty empty (64) visits
FALCON RICE MILL v. COMMUNITY RICE MILL

Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Decision date: Tuesday, 21 February 1984

empty empty empty empty empty (15) visits
SICILIA DI R. BIEBOW v. COX

Certiorari denied by 449 U.S. 899

Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Decision date: Friday, 18 May 1984

empty empty empty empty empty (41) visits
CONAGRA v. SINGLETON

Modified by 122 F.3d 1379

Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit
Decision date: Thursday, 11 October 1984

empty empty empty empty empty (6) visits
CONAN PROPERTIES v. CONANS PIZZA

Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Decision date: Monday, 4 February 1985

empty empty empty empty empty (12) visits
E. REMY MARTIN v. SHAW-ROSS INTERN. IMPORTS

Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit
Decision date: Monday, 8 April 1985

empty empty empty empty empty (21) visits
UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ATHLETIC ASS'N v. LAITE

Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit
Decision date: Monday, 8 April 1985

empty empty empty empty empty (24) visits
Counterclaim/Defendant v. Vernon WAY

Certiorari denied by 106 S.Ct. 134
Certiorari denied by 474 U.S. 845

Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit
Decision date: Monday, 15 April 1985

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TANDY CORPORATION v. MALONE

Certiorari denied by 106 S.Ct. 2277
Certiorari denied by 476 U.S. 1158

Jurisdiction: Sixth Circuit
Decision date: Wednesday, 31 July 1985

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IN RE OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATION.

Jurisdiction: Federal Circuit
Decision date: Tuesday, 8 October 1985

empty empty empty empty empty (51) visits
CPG PRODUCTS CORP. v. PEGASUS LUGGAGE

Jurisdiction: Federal Circuit
Decision date: Thursday, 17 October 1985

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Citation: 812 F.2d 1531 empty empty empty empty empty
Neutral citation: 1986 US App (11th) 669 0 votes
Legal status: Precedential 59 visits
Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit
Decision date: Wednesday, 10 December 1986
Tags related to the opinion:  no Tags
Citation: list of in going and out going citations to the present case
Citator: list of judicial treatments of the present case

Page 1, 812 F.2d 1531, 1531

AMBRIT, INC., f/k/a the Isaly Company, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, CrossAppellant, v.

KRAFT, INC., Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

No. 85-3609.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. Dec. 10, 1986.Footnote *



Certiorari Denied May 4,1987.

See 107 S.Ct. 1983. 1531

____________________

[Footnote *]

* This opinion, previously published at 805 F.2d 974, is republished to reflect the correct appearances of counsel.

Page 2, 812 F.2d 1531, 1532

Barry D. Rein, Robert M. Kunstadt, Michael C. Stuart, Pennie & Edmonds, New York City, Thomas H. Christopher, Kilpatrick & Cody, Atlanta, Ga., Jerry L. Newman, Rodney W. Morgan, Shear, Newman & Hahn, Tampa, Pla., for plaintiff-appellee, cross-appellant. Jerome Gilson, Gary M. Ropski, Susan Somers Neal, William Brinks Olds Hofer Gilson & Lione Ltd., Chicago, 111., Frank C. Jones, Charles M. Shaffer, Jr., King & Spalding, Atlanta, Ga., Donald W. Carlin, Seth A. Eisner, Dolores K. Hanna, Kraft, Inc., Glenview, 111., for defendant-appellant, cross-appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before CLARK, Circuit Judge, HENDERSON,Footnote * and WISDOM,** Senior Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Senior Circuit Judge: This appeal presents a variety of questions involving trade dress and trademark rights. The parties are competitors in the ice cream novelty market. The principal

____________________

[Footnote *]

* See Rule 3(b), Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

[Footnote **]

** Honorable John Minor Wisdom, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

Page 3, 812 F.2d 1531, 1533

question in this controversy is whether the trade dress of Kraft's Polar B'ar infringes the trade dress of Isaly's Klondike bar. The district court answered "Yes" to this question. 619 F.Supp. 983. We affirm, holding that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous and that the court's conclusions of law were correct.

FACTS The plaintiff in this action, the Isaly Company, Inc., ("Isaly"),¹ is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Clearwater, Florida. The defendant, Kraft, Inc. ("Kraft"), is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Glenview, Illinois. The parties are competitors in the stickless, five ounce, square, chocolate-covered ice cream bar market. Isaly sells its bar under the trademark "Klondike", and Kraft sells its bar under the trademark "Polar B'ar". The crux of the controversy concerns the packaging of those two products.

Isaly began in the last century as a family-owned dairy business operating in Eastern Ohio and Western Pennsylvania. In 1928 Isaly started making and selling five ounce, chocolate-covered, stickless ice cream bars under the name "Klondike". Isaly now sells three versions of the Klondike bar: plain, crispy, and chocolate/chocolate. The plain Klondike bar has been wrapped in pebbled foil featuring the colors silver, blue, and white since the 1940's. Since at least 1956 the wrapper has featured a 3 X 3 inch panel of silver, white, and blue, the words "Isaly's" and "Klondike", and the figure of a polar bear.

In 1978 Isaly revised the wrapper of the Klondike bar maintaining, however, the im pression the original wrapper conveyed.

The colors, images, and words on the wrap per remained the same, but "Klondike" was emphasized, "Isaly's" was reduced in size, and the stance of the polar bear was altered. Since 1978, the wrapper has re mained the same. The plain Klondike bar is wrapped in pebbled foil presenting a 3 X _____3 inch silver panel featuring a white polar

1. Since instituting this action in 1982, Isaly has changed its name to AmBrit, Inc. We shall bear on all fours before a sunburst design. Both the polar bear and the sunburst are outlined and highlighted with royal blue. Below the bear is the word "Klondike", written in large white letters outlined in royal blue. "Isaly's" appears in small blue letters to the right of the bear. The crispy and chocolate/chocolate wrappers are identical except that those wrappers use the colors yellow and brown respectively in place of the white color used on the plain wrapper.

Isaly began seiling the Klondike in a six-pack arrangement in 1963, and between 19G3 and 1978 some six-packs were offered in trays overwrapped in clear plastic. Since 1978, all six-packs have been sold in transparently overwrapped trays with a double layer of three bars, presenting the Klondike wrapper three times. The trays are silver and feature a large numeral "6" on the side. The end panels of the Klondike trays display a copy of the appropriate wrapper design depending on the version of the bar contained in the tray.

Until 1978, Isaly sold the Klondike bar in a tri-state area composed of Western Pennsylvania, Eastern Ohio, and Northern West Virginia. Isaly advertised in newspapers and in point-of-sales materials in stores, both of which featured the polar bear emblem found on the bar's wrapper. Isaly also advertised on television in a commercial featuring a polar bear and prospector in a supermarket.

In 1978, Isaly began to investigate the possibility of expanding the market for the Klondike bar. Isaly decided to introduce the bar into supermarkets and convenience stores in various expansion markets. To augment the expansion it achieved on its own, Isaly approached Kraft, an international manufacturer and distributor of food products, concerning a distribution arrangement between the two parties. Although Kraft's dairy group produces its own ice cream products, which are principally distributed under the brand names "Sealtest" and "Breyers", since 1970 that refer to the company as "Isaiy" throughout this opinion.

Page 4, 812 F.2d 1531, 1534

group has also distributed ice cream products made by other companies. The parties agreed that Kraft would distribute the Klondike bar in Florida and that Isaly would be responsible for most of the advertising in that market.

The introduction of the Klondike bar into the Florida market in early 1979 was highly successful and Kraft was well satisfied. Kraft had previously been unsuccessful with its ice cream novelty line and viewed the Klondike bar as a way to change that pattern. In October 1979, Kraft informed Isaly that it was interested in purchasing Isaly or having Isaly package its bars for Kraft under the Sealtest name. Isaly rejected these proposals, suggesting instead that Kraft expand its distribution of the Klondike bar. Kraft stated, however, that it was reluctant to expand distribution without a proprietary interest in the product.

In late 1979, Kraft began to develop its own five ounce chocolate-covered ice cream bar. Kraft attempted to duplicate the exact size and taste of the Klondike bar. Kraft chose the name "Polar B'ar" after finding that name on a list of unused trademarks. A predecessor of Kraft, Southern Dairies, Inc., had sold an ice cream bar under that trademark from 1929 to 1932, and periodically renewed the trademark registration. Through merger, Kraft acquired it.

Kraft employed two firms to design the packaging for the Polar B'ar product, making clear to these firms that the functional features of the Polar B'ar package were to resemble as closely as possible the Klondike bar package. The bars were to be wrapped in foil and sold in six-pack trays overwrapped in transparent plastic. Kraft supplied these design firms with samples of the Klondike packaging to aid them in their efforts.

The designers presented Kraft with a number of different wrapper designs but ultimately chose the one Isaly now challenges. That wrapper presents a 3x3 pebbled silver foil panel with a white polar bear standing on all fours contained within a colored triangle in the bottom right corner. "Polar B'ar" is written in large colored block letters diagonally across the center of the bar. "Sealtest" is written in script in a red box in the upper left corner, and the phrase "made with real milk chocolate" appears in a red circle in the bottom left corner of the panel.

In 1980 Kraft sold Polar B'ars in two forms: plain and "crunchy". The colors of the triangle and block letters on the wrappers varied with each version. Plain wrappers used royal blue and "crunchy" wrappers used red. Later, Kraft introduced four new versions of the bar: chocolate, mint, heavenly hash, and peanut butter, using the colors brown, green, light blue, and golden brown respectively.

As planned, Kraft sold Polar B'ars in a six-pack tray overwrapped in clear plastic.

The tray employs a silver background and displays a large numeral "6" between the brand name and the product description.

The end panels of Kraft's tray feature a large white polar bear and the words "Polar B'ar" in large block letters against a background colored to correspond with the version of the bar contained in the tray.

Kraft promoted the bar with television and newspaper advertising. Its television commercial featured the figure of a bear.

Then came a bear's roar when the camera shifted to the polar bar wrapper.

Kraft was the exclusive distributor of the Klondike bar in Florida from 1979 to 1982. In February 1982 Kraft notified Isaly in writing of its intention to terminate its distribution of Klondike as of April 1982.

In May 1982 Isaly initiated this suit. Isaly asserted that Kraft's packaging: (1) constituted a false designation of origin under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act,² (2) infringed

Isaly's federal trademarks covering its label and package designs,Footnote 3 (3) constituted common law unfair competition, (4) diluted Isaly's trade dress in violation of Florida statutory law, Footnote 4 and (5) constituted unfair

____________________

[Footnote **]

2. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).

[Footnote 3]

3. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).

[Footnote 4]

4. Fla.Stat. § 495.151 et seq.

Page 5, 812 F.2d 1531, 1535

competition under Florida law. Footnote 5

amended its complaint seeking to have Kraft's Polar B'ar trademark cancelled.

Kraft denied all of Isaly's claims and asserted the defense of laches. After a long trial, the district court ruled in favor of * the trademark and false designation of origin claims. Footnote 6

The court rejected Kraft's laches defense and Isaly's request to cancel Kraft's trademark. The court then entered an injunctive order and scheduled a hearing on the damages issue. Footnote 7

Both parties appealed.

DISCUSSION I. Trade

Dress Infringement Kraft's first contention on appeal is that the district court erred in finding Kraft guilty of trade dress infringement. Kraft does not contend that the district court applied the wrong test in making this finding, but rather argues that the district court misapplied the proper test.

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act states in relevant part: Any person who shall ... use in connection with any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods ... any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same ... shall be liable to a civil action by ... any person who believes he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation. Footnote 8

Isaly later This Court has held that Section 43(a) creates a federal cause of action for trade dress infringement. Footnote 9

As we stated in John Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., Footnote 10 " 'Trade Dress' involves the total image of a product and may include features such as ¦ Isaly on size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales n techniques." The trade dress at issue in this controversy is the wrapper and packaging of Isaly's Klondike bar.

As the district court below held, to prevail on a trade dress infringement claim under § 43(a), the plaintiff must prove three elements: 1) its trade dress is inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning, 2) its trade dress is primarily nonfunctional, and 3) the defendant's trade dress is confusingly similar. Footnote 12

The district court found that Isaly had established all three elements and therefore ruled in favor of Isaly on the trade dress infringement claim. Kraft contends that the district court erred in its conclusion with respect to each element. Because each element involves a finding of fact, we cannot overturn the decision of the district court absent clear error on at least one element. We now review the district court's findings.

A. Inherent Distinctiveness or Secondary Meaning At the outset, the plaintiff must establish that its trade dress is inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning. Footnote 13

____________________

[Footnote 5]

5. Fla.Stat. § 501.201 et seq.

[Footnote 6]

6. The district court did not address the state law claims separately, apparently ruling that a reso lution of those claims was unnecessary in the light of its disposition of the federal claims. Because neither party has specifically raised this as a point of error and because of our disposition of the federal claims, we need not review the district court's handling of the state law claims.

[Footnote 7]

7. The parties had entered into a pre-trial stipula tion that the trial court would address only the liability issues and that subsequent proceedings would deal with the damages issue if necessary.

[Footnote 8]

8. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).

[Footnote 9]

9. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc.,  684 F.2d 821, 830-32 (11th Cir.1982); Sun-Fun Products, Inc. v. Suntan Research & Development, Inc.,  656 F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).

[Footnote 10]

10.  711 F.2d 966 (11th Cir.1983).

[Footnote 11]

11. Id. at 980, citing, Original Appalachian Art works, Inc., 684 F.2d at 831.

[Footnote 12]

12. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp.,  716 F.2d 854, 857 (11th Cir.1983); John H. Har land Co., 711 F.2d at 980.

[Footnote 13]

13. See Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Pur chasing Groups, Inc.,  659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), cert, denied, 457 U.S. 1126, 102 S.Ct. 2947, 73 L.Ed.2d 1342 (1982). See also University of Georgia Athletic Association v. Laite,  756 F.2d 1535, 1540-41 (nth Cir.1985) holding that an inherently distinctive service-

Page 6, 812 F.2d 1531, 1536

Manifestly, if the plaintiffs trade dress is not sufficiently distinctive to allow consumers to identify the product from the trade dress, then the dress does not inherently serve as an indication of origin and the plaintiff can claim no right to the exclusive use of that trade dress. Even if a competitor appropriated the identical trade dress, the plaintiff would not be injured because the plaintiff's trade dress does not serve to distinguish its goods from those of its competitor's. Alternatively, a finding of secu ondary meaning suffices to establish protectability because such a finding means that notwithstanding the indistinctiveness of the trade dress, the consuming public has come to associate that trade dress with the product's producer. The district court found that at the time Polar B'ar was introduced in 1980, the trade dress of Isaly's Klondike was inherently distinctive and had acquired secondary meaning. Kraft challenges both of these findings. Because we hold that the district court's finding with respect to inherent distinctiveness is not clearly erroneous, we need not address the secondary meaning issue. In assessing the inherent distinctiveness of the Klondike trade dress, the district court considered the factors enunciated by this Court in Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. Suave Shoe Corporation, Footnote 15 we stated that a court should examine the trade dress and consider, among other factors: whether it [is] a "common" basic shape or design, whether it [is] unique or un usual in a particular field, [and] whether it [is] a mere refinement of a commonlyadopted and well-known form of orna mentation for a particular class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or orna mentation for the goods____ Footnote 16

Unlike the "V" or "7" in Brooks, the Klondike trade dress is not a basic shape or common design. Rather, as the district court found, the Klondike wrapper with its square size, bright coloring, pebbled texture, polar bear and sunburst images, and distinctive style of printing is "a complex composite of size, color, texture and graphics ___ [creating] a distinctive visual impression". Footnote 17

The court, hewing close to the language in Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, ls Inc., noted that the wrapper includes features that are "arbitrary and serve no function either to describe the product or assist in its effective packaging", Footnote 19 and found the wrapper trade dress inherently distinctive.

Kraft challenges this finding on two grounds. It first argues that the silver foil, the color royal blue, and the arctic sun where

____________________

[Footnote 13]

mark is protectable under § 43(a) without showing of secondary meaning. We have not previously ruled that inherently distinctive trade dress can be protected under § 43(a) without a showing of secondary meaning, but we have on several occasions noted the merit of such an approach. E.g., University of Georgia Athletic Association, 756 F.2d at 1541 & n. 14; John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 981 n. 25; Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 716 F.2d at 857 & n. 9. The Fifth Circuit has adopted such an approach in Chevron Chemical Co., and although that decision is not binding in this circuit, see Bonrter v. City of Prichard,  661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.1981) (en bane) (all decisions of Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit), it is entitled to great weight because it is based on cases of the former Fifth Circuit that are binding precedent in this circuit. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc., 684 F.2d at 831 n. 14. Our holding in University of Georgia Athletic Assoc. that an inherently distinctive trademark or servicemark may be protected under § 43(a) without a showing of secondary meaning, foreshadowed our decision today extending that rule to trade dress as well. 756 F.2d at 1540-41. See generally Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox,  732 F.2d 417, 426 n. 7 (5th Cir.1984) discussing the rationale for not requiring secondary meaning before extending protection to inherently distinctive trade dress.

[Footnote 14]

14. Secondary meaning is the connection in the consumer's mind between the mark and the product's producer, whether that producer is known or unknown.

[Footnote 15]

15.  716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir.1983).

[Footnote 16]

16. Id. at 858 quoting Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd.,  568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P. A.1977).

[Footnote 17]

17. Order at 11-12.

[Footnote 18]

18.  659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir.1981).

[Footnote 19]

19. Order at 11.

Page 7, 812 F.2d 1531, 1537

and polar bear images all connote cold and are therefore not inherently distinctive when used in connection with ice cream novelties. Kraft also argues that third parties have used these same elements in connection with their packaging of ice cream products and frozen desserts. Kraft asserts that when viewed in context of the Brooks factors, these third party uses indicate that the Klondike trade dress is not unique and is a mere refinement of a commonly-adopted form of ornamentation for ice cream products. The district court rejected both of these arguments. The ruling was not clearly erroneous. Trademarks and trade dress may be classified as generic, descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary. Footnote 20

Once conceived as distinct categories, these rubrics are now commonly viewed as "central tones in a spectrum". Footnote 21

Within this spectrum, the distinctiveness of a product's trade dress increases as it moves toward the suggestive or arbitraryend of the spectrum. The overall appearance of the Klondike trade dress and of its constituent elements is arbitrary or suggestive. Footnote 22

The trade dress does not describe the ice cream product, rather it suggests to the consumer the coldness of the product. Such trade dress is inherently distinctive under Section 43(a). Footnote 23

Isolated or piecemeal third party uses of various elements of the Klondike trade dress do not detract from the distinctiveness of the overall impression conveyed by the combination of those elements on the Klondike wrapper. Indeed, third party use of one or more suggestive or arbitrary elements of a plaintiff's trade dress renders that trade dress indistinct only if the third party use is so extensive and so similar to the plaintiff's that it impairs the ability of consumers to use the trade dress of the products to identify their source. Footnote 24

Extensive and similar use is not present in the instant case. Indeed, the record reveals no prior use of any combination of the Klondike trade dress elements that is at all similar to the unique impression conveyed by Isaly's trade dress.

The district court did not commit clear error in ruling that the Klondike trade dress was inherently distinctive and therefore protectable without a showing of secondary meaning. Footnote 25

____________________

[Footnote 20]

20. As this court stated in Freedom Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Way,  757 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, ' U.S. ------, 106 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed.2d 110 (1985). Generic marks refer to a particular genus or class of which an individual service [or product] is but a member; such marks may never receive ... protection. Descriptive marks directly describe a characteristic or quality of the service [or product], and can only be protected if they have acquired "secondary meaning." "Vision Center," when used to describe a place to purchase eyeglasses, would be a descriptive name. Suggestive marks subtly connote something about the service [or product] so that a consumer could use his or her imagination and determine the nature of the service [or product]. The term "Penguin" would be suggestive of refrigerators. ... An arbitrary or fanciful mark is a word in common usage applied to a service [or product] unrelated to its meaning; "Sun Bank" is such an arbitrary or fanciful mark when applied to banking services. Id. at 1182 n. 5 (citations omitted).

[Footnote 21]

21. Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Community Rice Mill, Inc.,  725 F.2d 336, 346 (5th Cir.1984), quoting, Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.,  617 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir.1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 981, 101 S.Ct. 1516, 67 L.Ed.2d 816 (1981).

[Footnote 22]

22. That the Patent and Trademark Office issued trademarks covering the trade dress at issue without requiring a showing of secondary meaning bolsters the conclusion that the Klon dike trade dress is not generic or descriptive.

[Footnote 23]

23. See Chevron Chemical Co., 659 F.2d at 702 (trade dress is protectable if it is arbitrary and not descriptive), University of Georgia Athletic Assoc, 756 F.2d at 1541; CPG Prods. Corp. v. Pegasus Luggage, Inc.,  776 F.2d 1007, 1012 (Fed. Cir.1985) (construing Eleventh Circuit prece dents).

[Footnote 24]

24. See generally University of Georgia Athletic Assoc.,  756 F.2d 1535, finding a servicemark inherently distinctive notwithstanding third par ty uses, because most third parties had not used a substantially similar servicemark and those who had did not use mark extensively.

[Footnote 25]

25. That the threshold of inherent distinctiveness for trade dress is relatively low does not neces sarily mean that the first competitor in a market can, through appropriation and use, monopolize trade dress elements that the consuming public would naturally associate with the type of prod uct being offered. Except in instances where a particular element of trade dress is inherently distinctive and therefore able to serve as an indicator of service, § 43(a) protects not the individual elements of a producer's trade dress,

Page 8, 812 F.2d 1531, 1538

B.

Functionality

Trade dress is protectible under section 43(a) only if it is primarily nonfunctional. Footnote 26

The district court found the Klondike tray with its plastic overwrap functional. Kraft was therefore free to imitate those features of the Klondike packaging with complete impunity. A contrary result would hinder Kraft in its attempt to compete effectively with Isaly.

That individual elements of packaging are functional does not, however, render the package as a whole unprotectible. Footnote 27

The district court found that "the Klondike foil wrapper, with its graphics, is primarily nonfunctional". Footnote 28

Kraft does not seriously dispute this finding, and indeed any such challenge would be misplaced. The actual wrapper may be functional, but its appearance is not. That the wrapper is primarily nonfunctional does not mean that Kraft may not use a foil wrapper in connection with the packaging of its five-ounce ice cream novelties. Rather, Kraft is precluded only from using a foil wrapper with an overall appearance that is confusingly similar to the wrapper used in Isaly.

C.

Likelihood of Confusion "[T]he touchstone test for a violation of § 43(a) is the "likelihood of confusion" resulting from the defendant's adoption of a trade dress similar to the plaintiffs." Footnote 29

In determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists, the fact finder evaluates a number of elements including: the strength of the trade dress, the similarity of design, the similarity of the product, the similarity of retail outlets and purchasers, the similarity of advertising media used, the defendant's intent, and actual confusion. Footnote 30

The issue of likelihood of confusion is not determined by merely analyzing whether a majority of the subsidiary factors indicates that such a likelihood exists. Rather, a court must evaluate the weight to be accorded the individual factors and then make its ultimate decision. Footnote 31

The appropriate weight to be given to each of these factors varies with the circumstances of the case.

The district court evaluated these factors, weighed them carefully, and found that Kraft's trade dress creates a likelihood of confusion. Kraft rejects this finding arguing that the district court misapplied the above test. A finding of likelihood of confusion is a finding of fact and is reviewed by this court under the clearly erroneous standard. Footnote 32

Although that standard is not applicable "when a district court labors under a misapprehension concerning the governing legal norms", Footnote 33 we find that in evaluating a likelihood of confusion the district court properly applied the appropri-

____________________

[Footnote 25]

but rather their combination and the unique impression conveyed by that combination. In Chevron Chemical Co., the court extended protection to a mere combination of colors in a simple three band design.  659 F.2d 695. But the Chevron court was quick to point out that latecomers were free to use the same colors or the same design as long as their trade dress did not convey the same visual impression. Id. at 703. In the same vein, latecomers in the five ounce chocolate-covered ice cream bar market may use certain elements of the Klondike trade dress as long as their use does not convey the same visual impression.

[Footnote 26]

26. See generally Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co., 732 F.2d at 426-30, discussing the distinction be tween features that are functional and those that are not.

[Footnote 27]

27. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,  604 F.2d 200, 203-04 (2d Cir.1979), cited with approval in John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 982-84.

[Footnote 28]

28. Order at 17.

[Footnote 29]

29. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc., 684 F.2d at 831-32.

[Footnote 30]

30. Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exchange of Houston, Inc.,  628 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir.1980); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc., 684 F.2d at 832.

[Footnote 31]

31. Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc.,  716 F.2d 833, 840 n. 17 (11th Cir.1983).

[Footnote 32]

32. Id. at 840; Exxon Corp., 628 F.2d at 504.

[Footnote 33]

33. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp.,  549 F.2d 368, 384 (5th Cir. 1977).

Page 9, 812 F.2d 1531, 1539

ate legal test. Footnote 34

Our review is thereby confined to an inquiry as to whether the court's finding is clearly erroneous. A survey of the likelihood of confusion factors in this case convinces us that the district court's finding is not clearly erroneous.

1. Strength of the Trade Dress The strength of the Klondike trade dress determines the scope of protection it will receive: strong trade dress receives strong protection, and weak trade dress receives weak protection. The strength of a particular trade dress is determined by a number of factors that establish its standing in the marketplace. Footnote 35

Relying on its finding that the trade dress was inherently distinctive and had acquired secondary meaning, the district court concluded that the Klondike trade dress was strong. A more thorough analysis, however, is needed to determine the scope of protection appropriate for the Klondike trade dress. A finding of inherent distinctiveness indicates that the Klondike trade dress will be protected, but the appropriate degree of protection is determined by examining a number of factors that establish the standing of the trade dress in the marketplace: most notably, the type of trade dress and the extent of the third party uses. Footnote 36

In analyzing the scope of protection a particular trade dress warrants, a court must first consider the type of trade dress involved. As noted above, trade dress may be classified as generic, descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary, and the scope of protection increases as the trade dress moves toward the arbitrary end of the spectrum. Isaly's trade dress is composed of a number of elements suggesting the coldness of the Klondike bar. The Klondike trade dress is therefore mainly suggestive. Although there is no clear pattern in this circuit as to what type of protection suggestive trade dress warrants under § 43(a) Footnote 37 , we hold that the mainly suggestive Klondike trade dress merits at least moderate protection.

The second scope-of-protection factor is the extent of third party use. As noted in the discussion of inherent distinctiveness, a number of third parties have used various elements of the Klondike trade dress. The record indicates that, in connection with the sale of frozen desserts, at least eight third parties have used a polar bear image, and that numerous third parties have used silver foil, an arctic sun image, or the royal blue color. Although not as extensive as the third party uses that have led to weak protection in other cases, Footnote 38 these uses do require the court to extend less protection to the Klondike wrapper than it would in their absence. Use of isolated elements of the Klondike trade dress that do not convey the same total image does not, however, lead to the Klondike wrapper being stripped of protection. Footnote 39

____________________

[Footnote 34]

34. See Sun Banks of Florida, Inc. v. Sun Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc,  651 F.2d 311, 314 (5th Cir.1981) (statement in Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. "may not be taken as an erosion of the standard of review applicable to a finding of likelihood of confusion").

[Footnote 35]

35. Sun Banks of Florida, Inc., 651 F.2d at 315.

[Footnote 36]

36. Id. at 315-17; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc.,  675 F.2d 1160, 1164 (11th Cir.1982); John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 975. The strength of the mark analysis is much the same as the inherent distinctiveness analysis. While the latter is concerned with determining whether a threshold level of distinctiveness has been reached, the former is more thorough in that its goal is to determine the degree of dis tinctiveness of a particular trade dress.

[Footnote 37]

37. Compare John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 975 ("suggestive or possibly ... descriptive" mark accorded weak protection) with Safeway Stores, Inc., 675 F.2d at 1165 (suggestive mark is "relatively strong one") and University of Georgia Athletic Assoc, 756 F.2d at 1545 (mark that is suggestive if not arbitrary characterized as "strong").

[Footnote 38]

38. See Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,  615 F.2d 252, 259 (5th Cir.) (72 third party uses led to weak protection), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 899, 101 S.Ct. 268, 66 L.Ed.2d 129 (1980); Sun Banks of Florida, Inc., 651 F.2d at 316 (4400 uses in Florida alone led to weak protection). But see Safeway Stores, Inc., 675 F.2d at 1165 ("score" of third party uses did not prevent suggestive mark from being "relatively strong").

[Footnote 39]

39. University of Georgia Athletic Assoc., 756 F.2d at 1545 (third party users do not necessarily diminish a mark's strength); Safeway Stores, Inc., 675 F.2d at 1165.

Page 10, 812 F.2d 1531, 1540

Our review of the evidence leads us to conclude that were we to make the determination as to the strength of Isaly's trade dress de novo, we would accord that trade dress moderate, as opposed to either strong or weak, protection.

10

The Klondike trade dress is suggestive, and third parties have used most of the elements of that trade dress. We need not decide, however, whether the district court's finding that the Klondike trade dress warranted strong protection is clearly erroneous. Given that the amalgam of the other likelihood of confusion factors points so strongly in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion, it does not matter whether the Klondike trade dress is accorded strong or moderate protection, for in either case, the finding of likelihood of confusion is not clearly erroneous.

2. Similarity of Design The similarity of design test has been described as " 'really nothing more than a subjective eyeball test.' ... The similarity of design is determined by considering the overall impression created by the mark as a whole rather than simply comparing individual features of the marks." Footnote 41

Following this approach, the district court stated, "Upon visual inspection, the wrapped bars convey the same overall appearance." Footnote 42

Kraft strenuously objects to this finding.

Kraft asserts that in making its finding of similarity of design the court disregarded the word marks "Sealtest", "Polar B'ar", "Isaly's", and "Klondike". Kraft also argues that a comparison of the packages reveals many differences including a different overall impression.

Kraft is correct in asserting that the presence of dissimilar word marks lessens the possibility of a finding of similarity of design. Footnote 43

Use of distinguishing word marks does not, however, preclude a finding of similarity of design. Footnote 44

The similarity of design test is an inquiry into the overall similarity of the defendant's trade dress with that of the plaintiff. Therefore, the dissimilar word marks may not be considered separately; rather, they must be considered in the context of the trade dress as a whole.

Even a cursory reading of the district court's order makes clear that in analyzing the overall appearance of the trade dress of

____________________

[Footnote 40]

40. The district court also found that the Klondike trade dress had acquired secondary meaning. This finding is probative on the strength of the mark issue because it also establishes the mark's standing in the marketplace. See John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 974 n. 13. Kraft challenges the district court's finding of secondary meaning. We agree with Kraft that Isaly's extensive sales'36 million bars in the 1980 fiscal year'and advertising do not necessarily establish secondary meaning. See Aloe Cream Laboratories, Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., All F.2d 845, 850 (5th Cir.) (key issue in secondary meaning inquiry is not extent of promotional efforts but their effectiveness), cert, denied, 398 U.S. 928, 90 S.Ct. 1818, 26 L.Ed.2d 90 (1970). But sales and advertising may be considered by the finder of fact in making the secondary meaning inquiry. Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton,  743 F.2d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir.1984). The district court's finding of secondary meaning is not clearly erroneous. See Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 716 F.2d at 860 (finding on secondary meaning issue reversible only for clear error). The existence of secondary meaning leads to greater protection for the Klondike's trade dress. On the other hand, the Klondike trade dress is protectable mainly because it presents a "distinctive visual impression", not. because the elements of that trade dress are arbitrary or unusual. As the Fifth Circuit held in Falcon Rice Mill, Inc., a "distinctive visual impression" normally receives weak protection. 725 F.2d at 346. Nonetheless, a "distinctive visual impression" will be protected. See Chevron Chemical Co.,  659 F.2d 695. And indeed, a "distinctive visual impression" composed of suggestive elements will be accorded greater protection than one composed of generic or descriptive elements. Cf. Falcon Rice Milt, Inc.,  725 F.2d 336.

[Footnote 41]

41. Exxon Corp., 628 F.2d 504-05 (citation omit ted).

[Footnote 42]

42. Order at 19.

[Footnote 43]

43. John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 980 n. 24. That the defendant has placed on its products marks that are different from those employed by the plaintiff is also probative on the intent and actual confusion factors under the likeli hood of confusion test.

[Footnote 44]

44. See John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d 981, n. 24; see generally Sun-Fun Products, Inc.,  656 F.2d 186 (likelihood of confusion possible notwith standing dissimilar word marks); Chevron Chemical Co.,  659 F.2d 695 (finding similarity of design and likelihood of confusion notwith standing dissimilar word marks).

Page 11, 812 F.2d 1531, 1541

the products the district court did not disregard the dissimilar word marks. Indeed, the court even mentioned that each wrapper displayed "the product name printed in large block letters, accompanied by the company name (Sealtest or Isaly's) in much smaller script lettering". Footnote 45

Kraft next argues that the design and color of the trade dress of each product are simply not similar. Kraft points again to the dissimilar word marks and also to the differences between the modern design of the Polar B'ar trade dress and the old-fashioned tone of the Klondike trade dress. In assessing Kraft's contention, it is important to remember that, regardless of the ready accessibility of the exhibits to the reviewing court and the ability of this Court to see as well as the district court, the district court's finding that the designs are similar is still reversible only for clear error. Footnote 46

Viewing the trade dress as a whole, the overall impression conveyed by each is similar. An inspection of the wrappers of the plain Klondike and the plain Polar B'ar Footnote 47 reveals that each is the same size, each has a textured silver foil background, each is printed primarily with blue and white inks, each includes the product name in large block letters and the company name in smaller script, and each features a polar bear. Footnote 48

Although a close examination of the two wrappers reveals significant differences, a court may not view trade dress in a vacuum. Rather, a court must consider how the trade dress would function in the actual market place. Ice cream novelties are impulse items stored in frosty freezer cases and sold in busy grocery stores to hurried shoppers. When viewed in this context, the general similarity of the design of the trade dress of the two products is an even stronger indication of the existence of likelihood of confusion.

3.

Similarity of the Products That the products involved are similar is evidence tending to prove the existence of a likelihood of confusion. Footnote 49

The district court found and we agree that the products in the instant case are identical. Both are competitively priced, five ounce, stickless, chocolate-covered ice cream bars.

4.

Similarity of Retail Outlets and Pur chasers Likelihood of confusion is more probable if the products are sold through the same channels to the same purchasers. Footnote 50

The district court found that the products are both sold through the same channels, pri-

____________________

[Footnote 45]

45. Order at 19.

[Footnote 46]

46. Relying on Sicilia Di R. Biehow & Co., Til F.2d 417, and John H. Harland Co.,  711 F.2d 966, Kraft asserts that this court is in as good a position to apply the subjective eyeball test as the lower court. In essence Kraft is asking this court to review the finding of similarity of de sign de novo. We decline this invitation. A finding of similarity is a finding of fact reversible only for clear error. Jellibeans, Inc., 716 F.2d at 842. Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. and John H. Harland Co. are not to the contrary. In both of those cases, the appellate court undertook an analysis of the similarity of the designs, but that does not mean that those courts were substituting their own judgment for that of the district court. Rather, each of those appellate courts was simply evaluating the evidence to determine whether the district court's decision was clearly erroneous. Moreover, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Anderson v. City of Bessemer,  470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), makes clear that an appellate court reviewing a finding of fact is constrained by the clearly erroneous standard even when the finding of fact does not turn on the credibility of witnesses or was such that the reviewing court was in as good a position as the district court to review the evidence.

[Footnote 47]

47. The district court discussed at length only the similarities between the wrappers for the plain bars but found that all of Kraft's wrappers were similar to Isaly's. We agree with that conclu sion and take a parallel approach in assessing the similarity of design of the trade dress.

[Footnote 48]

48. Although we have described the elements of the wrappers that are similar, we are not mak ing a comparison of individual elements. Rath er, we are explaining why the overall impres sion of each wrapper is similar. The district court correctly followed this same approach. We note that the manner in which the products are presented to the consumers, in the overwrapped six-pack trays, amplifies the similarity of the trade dress.

[Footnote 49]

49. Exxon Corp., 628 F.2d at 505.

Page 12, 812 F.2d 1531, 1542

marily supermarkets and convenience stores, to the same purchasers. Kraft has not challenged this finding.

5.

Similarity of Advertising Media If the plaintiff and defendant both use the same advertising media, a finding of likelihood of confusion is more probable. Footnote 51

The district court found that both parties use the same advertising media, primarily television and radio, and that the advertisements were themselves similar. This finding is clearly correct.

6.

Defendant's Intent Kraft's intent in adopting the Polar B'ar trade dress is a critical factor because a finding that Kraft adopted the trade dress with the intent of deriving benefit from the reputation of Isaly's Klondike may alone be enough to justify the inference that there is confusing similarity. Footnote 52

In assessing the intent factor, the district court found that "Kraft intended to emulate if not infringe". Footnote 53

Kraft and Isaly have both argued as to the meaning of that phrase and as to whether the evidence supports the position of the other party. After reviewing that phrase and the context in which it is found, we are convinced that the district court's finding was based on solid evidence that Kraft intended to benefit from the goodwill of Isaly. We turn now to examine the evidence supporting that finding.

In early 1979, Kraft began distributing the Klondike bar for Isaly in Florida. The introduction of the Klondike bar in Florida was surprisingly successful. Kraft had been searching for an appropriate ice cream novelty product, and after witnessing the success of the Klondike bar, Kraft approached Isaly with an offer to either buy Isaly or have Isaly pack Klondike bars for Kraft under the Sealtest label. Isaly rejected this offer, proposing instead that Kraft expand its distribution of the Klondike bar. Kraft rejected that offer.

As a result of the distribution relationship, Kraft learned of Isaly's expansion plans for the Klondike bar and of information vital to the successful sale of an ice cream novelty like the Klondike bar. In late 1979, Kraft began developing its own five ounce, stickless, chocolate-covered ice cream bar. Kraft attempted to develop a bar that was, in almost all respects, identical with the highly successful Klondike bar.

Kraft chose to name its new product "Polar B'ar", a name that conveys a double meaning: "polar bear" and "cold bar". At the time it chose the name, Kraft was aware that the Klondike wrapper featured a polar bear. Moreover, prior to the time Kraft selected the name for its product, Isaly had undertaken some promotional and other efforts to develop an association between the polar bear symbol and the Klondike bar. Footnote 54

Kraft retained two design firms to design the packaging for the Polar B'ar. It is undisputed that Kraft requested these firms to copy the functional features of the Klondike packaging, such as the six-pack tray, the dead fold foil wrapper, and the clear plastic overwrap. To help achieve this goal, Kraft supplied the design firms with samples of the Klondike packaging and wrapper. It is also clear that, given the name Kraft had chosen for its product, the use of a polar bear image on the Polar B'ar wrapper was a foregone conclusion. The design firms offered Kraft a number of wrapper prototypes employing a variety of graphic designs. Kraft chose the design that Isaly is now challenging. The record reveals that Kraft knew of the distinct possibility that the wrapper design it chose infringed the Klondike trade dress. But Kraft never sought an opinion from legal counsel on that issue. Footnote 55

____________________

[Footnote 51]

51. Id. at 506.

[Footnote 52]

52. Amstar Corp., 615 F.2d at 263; Exxon Corp., 628 F.2d at 506.

[Footnote 53]

53. Order at 23.

[Footnote 54]

54. In addition to using commercials and a wrapper featuring a polar bear, Isaly had been involved with highly publicized activities such as donating polar bears to the Philadelphia Zoo.

[Footnote 55]

55. Isaly infers that Kraft never sought a legal opinion for fear that such an opinion would

Page 13, 812 F.2d 1531, 1543

Isaly argues that the unmistakable import of this evidence is that Kraft chose deliberately to come as close to the total image of the Klondike bar as possible. According to Isaly, even though Kraft may have intended to stay within legal bounds, it copied the Klondike bar and functional packaging features exactly and attempted to copy the Klondike trade dress to a sufficient degree that when combined with the other packaging features, Kraft would benefit from the reputation of Isaly's Klondike. Isaly correctly points out that even an intent to come as close as the law will allow is an intent to derive benefit from the other party's reputation and is therefore probative on the likelihood of confusion issue. Footnote 56

Indeed, Isaly argues that Kraft even chose its name with the intent of deriving benefit from Isaly's reputation.

Kraft argues, however, that it had no such intent to derive benefit from the reputation of Isaly. Rather, Kraft argues that it copied only those features that it had the right to copy, those that were in the public domain. Footnote 57

Kraft asserts that it copied those features not to benefit from Isaly's reputation, but to let the consumers know that they would be getting the same type of product as that offered by Isaly. Kraft points to the word mark "Polar B'ar", which it asserts is clearly not confusing with the "Klondike" word mark, and to the "Sealtest" logo, and argues that if it had been attempting to poach the goodwill of Isaly, it would not have used these distinctive and different marks. Footnote 58

There is no question that Kraft's argument finds support in the evidence'as does Isaly's'but even were we to accept Kraft's position, the district court's finding of intent on the part of Kraft to benefit from Isaly's goodwill would be proper. There is nothing unusual about a finding of intent based on circumstantial evidence. Footnote 59

Although Kraft was free to copy the Klondike product and the functional packaging features of that product, the finder of fact may infer from evidence of such actions an intent to derive benefit from Isaly's goodwill. Footnote 60

Such a finding is especially fitting when, as here, a review of Kraft's nonfunctional trade dress and that of the plaintiff reveals substantial similarities. Therefore, irrespective of which version of the facts is to be believed, the record supports the district court's finding that Kraft intended to benefit from the goodwill Isaly has built for itself. Footnote 61

7. Actual Confusion Actual consumer confusion is the best evidence of likelihood of confusion. Footnote 62

There is no absolute scale as to how many instances of actual confusion establish the existence of that factor. Rather, the court must evaluate the evidence of actual confusion in the light of the totality of the circumstances involved. Footnote 63

____________________

[Footnote 55]

confirm the concern expressed by several people involved with the development of the Polar B'ar concept and product: that the Polar B'ar wrapper infringed the Klondike wrapper.

[Footnote 56]

56. John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 977-78.

[Footnote 57]

57. Id. at 982 (absent copyright or patent protec tion, functional features may be copied with complete impugnity).

[Footnote 58]

58. The thrust of this argument is diminished to some degree because one of the connotations of "Polar B'ar" conveys the same impression as the polar bear image Isaly was promoting.

[Footnote 59]

59. Jellibeans, Inc., 716 F.2d at 843.

[Footnote 60]

60. John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 977 & n. 16.

[Footnote 61]

61. The parties' previous contractual or business relations is also probative on the likelihood of confusion issue. Sun-Fun Products, Inc., 656 F.2d at 189. In this case we view those business relations as a subfactor relating to intent. Kraft and Isaly had significant business dealings and through this association, Isaly allowed Kraft access to certain confidential information.

[Footnote 62]

62. Amstar Corp., 615 F.2d at 263; John H. Har land Co., 711 F.2d at 978.

[Footnote 63]

63. Jellibeans, Inc., 716 F.2d at 844. Compare Safeway Stores, Inc., 675 F.2d at 1167 (two in stances established actual confusion) and Jelli beans, Inc., 716 F.2d at 844 (three instances establish actual confusion) with Amstar Corp., 615 F.2d at 263 (three instances of confusion involving noncustomers in 15 years of concur rent use raises presumption against likelihood of confusion) and Sun Banks of Florida, Inc., 651 F.2d at 319 (19 instances of confusion in volving mostly noncustomers i